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ABSTRACT 
Since it openly became a nuclear state in 1998, India has dramatically expanded the 
quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal. This thesis examines the factors currently 
driving India’s nuclear weapons program. It explores India’s threat perceptions of China, 
its threat perceptions of Pakistan, its desire to achieve great power status, and domestic 
organizations relevant to its strategic program.  
After comparing each factor, the thesis concludes that India’s threat perception of 
China is the strongest driver. Due to the capability gaps in both conventional and nuclear 
forces that exist between the two states, India is committed to creating a strong strategic 
arsenal as its only means of credibly deterring China from possible conflict. The second 
strongest factor is its desire for great power status. India is still not accepted by every 
nuclear power as a peer, and by improving its capabilities, India hopes to gain greater 
recognition. Domestic elements are the third strongest factor since they have waned in 
influence as organizational changes have emphasized security concerns. Finally, India’s 
weakest driver is its security fear of Pakistan; its nuclear arsenal has reached the point 
where its leaders are confident they can deal with Pakistan in a strategic sense.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS 
This thesis examines what factor or factors are driving India’s nuclear weapons 
program. Ever since India became an openly nuclear power in 1998, it has engaged in a 
robust program of both modernizing and increasing the size of its strategic arsenal.1 It is 
now well on its way to achieving both an operational intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) and an operational ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), a feat that few nuclear 
powers have achieved. Debates over the program’s cost and its implications for 
international relations continue in both India and outside the country.2 By examining 
these debates, as well as other evidence, this thesis attempts to explain both the goals and 
the trajectory of India’s nuclear weapons program. Most of the current research outside 
India has been preoccupied with why it became an openly nuclear state; the scope of this 
paper focuses on events that occurred after 1998. 
What this thesis has found is that the strongest factor in explaining India’s current 
trend of nuclear modernization and expansion is its security fear over China. Indian 
leaders may not see a conflict with China as likely, but nevertheless, they fear the 
capability gap with their northern neighbor in both conventional and nuclear fields. In the 
viewpoint of these leaders, the best strategy to counteract such gaps is to build up a 
robust strategic arsenal that can provide a credible deterrent. The second-strongest factor 
is India’s desire for great power status, which has pushed it to engage in more 
technologically demanding delivery platforms to highlight its national pride and to 
increase its credibility as a true nuclear power. Although both security fears over China 
and the desire for great power status are the most potent factors, the China factor is 
stronger than the status factor due to recent organizational changes, which have 
emphasized military and security concerns. Domestic factors, such as political parties and 
                                                 
1 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists 68, no. 96 (2012): 100, DOI: 10.1177/0096340212451431. 
2 Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2011), 60; Waheguru Pal, Singh Sidhu, and Jing-Dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 145. 
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scientific agencies, are the third strongest factor, and have also weakened in potency due 
to the same organizational changes that have weakened the status factor. Finally, security 
fears over Pakistan, although prevalent in Indian society, are currently the weakest driver 
for India’s current nuclear weapons program since Indian leaders are confident that they 
now have the capabilities needed to deal with Pakistan in a strategic sense. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
India’s nuclear weapons program could potentially have serious implications for 
international relations and global proliferation. Despite being a relatively new nuclear 
power, it is bordered by two other nuclear states with which it shares a long history of 
conflict. One such state, Pakistan, will undoubtedly monitor the strategic situation with 
India and react accordingly. Due to the huge conventional disparity between the two 
nations, Pakistan sees its own nuclear program as an essential element for national 
survival, and has also engaged in its own modernization and arsenal-building plan.3 As 
India continues to build up its nuclear weapons program, a security spiral may ensue in 
which both nations take action to counter the other. This spiral could easily result in an 
arms race that would have grave implications for global proliferation and strategic 
stability in South Asia. Many of the factors that once caused President Clinton to declare 
South Asia as “the most dangerous place in the world”4 have not been resolved.  
The reaction of India’s other nuclear neighbor, China, will also have implications 
for Asian stability. Unlike Pakistan, China is not preoccupied with India’s strategic 
arsenal, and is far more concerned with the nuclear capability of the United States 
(U.S.).5 Yet, its interest in Indian nuclear capability was certainly sparked after the 1998 
tests.6 Furthermore, the tests themselves caused a ripple in Sino-Indian relations. India 
                                                 
3 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists 67, no. 91 (2011): 91–97, DOI: 10.1177/0096340211413360. 
4 Dexter Filkins, “India, Pakistan Inch Toward War as Clinton Visits,” Los Angeles Times, March 19, 
2000, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/19/news/mn-10448.  
5 Yang Yi, “The View from China,” in The China-India Nuclear Crossroads, ed. Lora Saalman 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2012), 21–22. 
6 Ming Zhang, China’s Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 15. 
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initially justified its nuclear explosions to the United States by describing China as a 
threat it needed to counter. This justification immediately garnered swift condemnation 
from Chinese authorities.7 Both nations later smoothed over this event as they each 
adopted a more cooperative approach. Nevertheless, several issues continue to hinder the 
relationship and India’s nuclear program may become one such stumbling block. 
Whether this program results in another security spiral with China depends on what 
factors continue to drive it. 
India’s nuclear weapons program could also affect relations with the United 
States. Immediately after the 1998 tests, the Clinton administration applied sanctions to 
both India and Pakistan.8 Afterwards, relations improved markedly, with the global 
superpower even signing a historic deal to open the way for civil nuclear assistance 
towards India in 2008.9 Yet, the deal itself had many critics within the United States, who 
have been primarily concerned with Indian nuclear proliferation since the agreement may 
free up the South Asian country’s domestic uranium reserves.10 A more comprehensive 
understanding of Indian motivations behind its nuclear weapons program may help U.S.-
Indian relations by better addressing proliferation concerns. Furthermore, this 
understanding may also help the United States in identifying factors that push other 
nations into creating or expanding their own nuclear weapons program, and thus, 
discourage global proliferation in a far more effective manner.  
C. HYPOTHESES 
Four hypotheses are examined to see which factors are the most influential for 
India’s nuclear weapons program. These hypotheses are security fears over China, 
security fears over Pakistan, the desire for great power status, and the power of domestic 
organizations. This analytical breakdown stems from a theoretical model by Scott Sagan, 
                                                 
7 Zhang, China’s Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests, 26. 
8 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1999), 436. 
9 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, last 
modified November 5, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663.  
10 Ibid.  
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who proposed three separate explanations for why a state would seek a nuclear weapon: 
security, norms, and domestic factors.11 Many scholars have used each of these models to 
explain why India became an open nuclear power in 1998, and these same models 
provide both a useful frame of reference and a starting point to explain what has driven 
India’s nuclear program beyond its declaration.  
The security model is one used by many Indian politicians to justify their 
program, as well as related technological advances. This model itself can be broken down 
into two possible hypotheses. In one hypothesis, India’s concern over China is the most 
important factor for modernizing its arsenal. Although the possibility of an outright war 
with China remains low, “mutual unease”12 continues to define the relationship between 
both nations. China won a decisive victory in its last conflict with India, and it maintains 
a significant advantage in both conventional and nuclear forces. India may view a 
credible and modern nuclear arsenal as an essential element to deter China from coercing 
India with force, especially on an outstanding issue, such as the ongoing border dispute.  
Another security-related hypothesis is India’s fear over Pakistan, a nation that has 
engaged in its own nuclear buildup. India maintains a large conventional advantage over 
its western neighbor, but the nuclear forces of both countries are roughly equal in size.13 
India may seek continued modernization and improvements so as not to fall behind 
Pakistan’s own efforts. Furthermore, unlike India, Pakistan has refused to adopt a no-first 
use doctrine, viewing the threat of a first strike as an essential element to its national 
survival.14 
The third hypothesis is based off Sagan’s norms model, in which a state seeks 
nuclear weapons because they provide “an important normative symbol of a state’s 
                                                 
11 Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–1997): 55. 
12 Lora Saalman, “Conclusion: Comparing the Comparable,” in The China-India Nuclear Crossroads, 
ed. Lora Saalman (Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2012), 172. 
13 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 75 (2013): 76, DOI: 1177/0096340213501363. 
14 Global Security Newswire, “Pakistani Army Chief Said to Oppose ‘No First Use’ Nuke Rule,” 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 9, 2011, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-army-chief-said-to-oppose-
no-first-use-nuke-rule/.  
 5 
modernity and identity.”15 From the norms model, it can be seen how India’s nuclear 
program may be motivated by its desire to establish its identity as a great power and gain 
international prestige. More than just a tool for deterrence, India wants a modern nuclear 
arsenal to prove that it can match the achievements of other nations. By mastering 
ballistic missiles and other nuclear-related technology, India could prove to other states 
that it is a serious power, which deserves greater recognition.  
The fourth hypothesis stems from Sagan’s domestic factors model. India’s 
program may be driven by internal elements, such as political elites who may try to use 
India’s nuclear program to garner popular support and to divert attention away from other 
issues within the nation. Another internal element could be India’s scientific defense 
bureaucracy, who may push the nuclear program forward to achieve both funding and 
technological milestones that can prove their expertise rivals that found in other advanced 
nations. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Both scholarly and political arguments have used each of the four hypotheses to 
explain the motivations behind India’s nuclear weapons program. Within India, many 
academics argue that security concerns over China are the primary drivers of India’s 
program. Since China maintains a large advantage both militarily and economically, it is 
the only nation that India must deter with a strong nuclear arsenal. A few analysts have 
argued that Pakistan is the primary security consideration, although more have argued 
that Indian fears are focused on escalation and proliferation, and as such, are the primary 
drivers of foreign policy as opposed to India’s own weapons program. Scholars outside 
India, especially from China, eschew both security models and usually argue that India’s 
desire for great power status best explains both the 1998 nuclear tests and actions taken 
since then. Finally, many others have argued that certain domestic organizations, such as 
the scientific research agencies, are the primary drivers of India’s nuclear weapons 
program since its inception. 
                                                 
15 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” 55. 
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For many analysts, India’s main motivation is the strategic threat it sees in China. 
Both Henry D. Sokolski16 and R. N. Ganesh17 in The Next Arms Race argue that India 
views China as the main driver of its strategic program. This view is also echoed in India. 
P. R. Chari, a visiting professor at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, states 
emphatically that “India’s military nuclear programme has uncompromisingly been 
directed against China and, [only] incidentally, against Pakistan.”18 Retired Rear Admiral 
Raja Menon states, “the Indian arsenal exists because the Chinese arsenal exists.”19 For 
all these scholars, a consistent message comes across that since China poses the strongest 
threat, India’s nuclear program must react to, and thus, be driven by, China’s own 
strategic arsenal. 
Other scholars argue that China is not necessarily a threat now, but due to its 
capabilities, India must focus its efforts on countering China’s future intentions. In 
India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, although Ashley Tellis argues that India’s current 
arsenal remains sufficient since China does not value any disputes enough to risk a 
nuclear exchange,20 he does concede that India may feel pressured to upgrade and 
enhance its arsenal if China “dramatically expanded its strategic nuclear capabilities” or 
if “Sino-Indian competition intensified over time.”21 This fear of how China’s future 
intentions may change towards India is echoed by a report from the Lowy Institute. In it, 
the report describes how “India may see China… as a more rational actor than Pakistan,” 
but nonetheless, worries about “the more open-ended threat that China might become 
                                                 
16 Henry D. Sokolski, “Overview,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 21. 
17 R. N. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South Asia,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D. 
Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 305. 
18 P. R. Chari, “India, Pakistan and the Nuclear Race: The Strategic Entanglement,” in India, Pakistan 
and the Nuclear Race, ed. Ruhee Neog, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (July 2013): 3, 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR142-Debate1307-NSP-NuclearRace.pdf.  
19 Menon Raja, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 182. 
20 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 
712. 
21 Ibid., 717. 
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were bilateral competition to turn to rivalry.”22 Although these scholars argue that India 
does not view China as a current threat, they admit that future nuclear doctrine will be 
driven by whatever actions China takes due to its capacity to grow and become a much 
more threatening adversary than Pakistan. 
Not every analyst agrees that India’s northern neighbor is the primary driver of its 
nuclear doctrine. Several scholars in Pakistan argue that their nation is the primary target. 
Salma Malik, a professor at Quiad-i-Azam University in Islamabad, states, “the bulk of 
India’s strategic arsenal, its force posturing, military doctrines, and procurement trends 
are primarily Pakistan-centric.”23 Yet, these views seem limited to Pakistan only. 
Certainly, a lot of literature in India and Western circles is available on Pakistan’s nuclear 
program, but the main topics center on the fear of escalation from conflict or 
misunderstandings. In particular, Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons, such as 
the Nasr tactical ballistic missile,24 has sparked discussions over whether the threshold 
for nuclear use has been lowered, increasing the possibility of a nuclear war. 
Furthermore, several scholars have argued that India does not see Pakistan as a strategic 
threat at all. In his response to critics of his editorial in the New York Times, Michael 
Krepon argues that India’s strategic community “underestimates the Pakistani military 
establishment’s willingness to pay for, and the Pakistani defense production 
establishment’s ability to deliver, a widely diversified and growing set of nuclear 
capabilities.”25 Ashley Tellis notes that even a modest nuclear arsenal should deter 
Pakistan since “its geophysical limitations make it highly vulnerable even to relatively 
low levels of retaliation.”26 No matter what actions Pakistan takes, it will be unable to 
                                                 
22 Fiona Cunningham and Rory Medcalf, The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India 
Relations (Australia Square, NSW: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2011), 5. 
23 Salma Malik, “India, Pakistan and the Nuclear Race: Strengthening the Risk Reduction Measures,” 
in India, Pakistan and the Nuclear Race, ed. Ruhee Neog, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2013, 12, 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR142-Debate1307-NSP-NuclearRace.pdf. 
24 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India, Pakistan and the Tactical Weapons: Implications of Hatf-9,” Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/ipcs-debate-india-pakistan-and-tactical-
nuclear-weapons-implications-of-4169.html.  
25 Michael Krepon, “India, Pakistan and the Nuclear Race: Evaluating the Response,” in India, 
Pakistan and the Nuclear Race, ed. Ruhee Neog, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, July 2013, 14, 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR142-Debate1307-NSP-NuclearRace.pdf. 
26 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 696. 
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change this weakness, and thus, will always be seen as vulnerable to an Indian 
counterattack. Unlike discussions centered on China, no conversation has been held on 
how to close a capability gap with Pakistan or fears over future intentions. Instead, the 
focus remains on how to better defuse current tensions so that hostilities do not reach the 
point of nuclear use. 
Other analysts have portrayed India’s desire for great power status as the main 
source of its nuclear weapons program. According to Ming Zhang, China views India’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons as motivated solely by its desire “to achieve great power 
status.”27 John Garver argues that India “seems to have been concerned primarily with 
enhancing its international status and only secondarily with countering possible Chinese 
nuclear coercion.”28 Although Zhang and Garver’s statements are specific to why India 
acquired the bomb in the first place, other commentators have pointed to national pride to 
explain India’s continued advancements in nuclear-related fields, most notably the recent 
successful launch of the Agni V missile. At the Institute of Chinese Studies, one 
commentator “viewed [the launch] in the context of India’s bid for permanent 
membership of the [UN] Security Council.”29 Furthermore, several Indian news articles 
have used the launch of the Agni V as an opportunity to compare India to the permanent 
members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council by noting that the member states 
are the only other powers besides India to have ICBMs.30  
Interestingly, much like its security concerns, some see India’s desire for 
international status as China-centric. According to a report by the Lowy Institute, China 
continuously resists any bilateral nuclear discussions since India is not a recognized 
nuclear weapons state under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is this 
“reluctance to thus acknowledge India as a nuclear peer,” that particularly “rankles the 
                                                 
27 Zhang, Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests, 27. 
28 John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 2001), 315. 
29 Institute of Chinese Studies, “Chinese Reactions to India’s Agni-V Firing,” May 2012, 
http://www.icsin.org/ICS/ICSAnalysispdf/4.pdf.  
30 India Today, “China, Europe within India’s Striking Range as Agni-V Tested Successfully for 
Second Time,” September 15, 2013, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-test-fires-agni-v-china-europe-
withing-indias-striking-range/1/309908.html. 
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Indian strategic community.”31 If India’s desire for international prestige is focused on 
Chinese perceptions, then it may engage in China-specific weapons not because of fears 
over security, but to send a message that India is a capable nation that deserves 
recognition. The Indian media reinforces this theme of China-specific signaling. When 
reporting on technological or military achievements, many Indian news articles slip in a 
reference to their northern neighbor, often outright stating that certain weapons were 
designed to counter China.32  
In scholarly debates about possible factors that led political elites to push for 
nuclear testing, desire for popular support has not come up as a strong motivator. 
Although the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) experienced an upswing in popularity after the 
1998 tests,33 most scholars have argued that the party was motivated by both a desire for 
greater security and a dream for transforming India into a great power.34 Post 1998, most 
discussions regarding India’s nuclear program have not covered how popular support 
may be a possible motivator. Another domestic factor that receives far more attention is 
the scientific bureaucracy. Thomas Graham argues that, after 1998, India’s “nuclear and 
defense scientists, who want to prove against most evidence to date that they are world 
class,” have become the primary drivers of the nuclear program.35 This opinion certainly 
has its detractors. While acknowledging that Indian scientific bodies, such as the 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) are “proactive politically,”36 Ashok Kapur paints a 
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different picture of India’s nuclear and defense scientists as being quite divided on how 
far their country should go in terms of nuclear testing.37 More than any desire for 
technical achievements, these scientists are also motivated by their own political 
convictions, which are just as diverse as the general public’s. 
Nearly all these works have focused on a single factor as the main explanation for 
driving India’s nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, these works have often conflated 
factors that have driven India to declare itself as an open nuclear power in 1998 with 
factors that continue to drive the program today. This thesis takes a comprehensive 
approach by investigating multiple hypotheses and comparing the evidence for each. 
Also, it draws a needed distinction between factors relevant today vice factors relevant 
before the first nuclear weapons tests.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis utilizes several approaches to weigh the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each hypothesis: China as a security threat, Pakistan as a security threat, 
the desire for great power status, and domestic factors within India. For three of these 
hypotheses, the same bodies of evidence are considered, namely elite statements and the 
capabilities of India’s nuclear weapons program itself. Each hypothesis also examines 
data more specific for its investigation. For instance, to explore the China security 
hypothesis better, Indian threat perceptions of China and recent Indian interactions with 
that country are weighed. The same examination is carried out for Indian threat 
perceptions of Pakistan.  
Statements from Indian elites, such as politicians and think tank leaders, can also 
help illuminate Indian threat perceptions for both China and Pakistan. Furthermore, some 
statements may also shed a light on Indian decisions that impact its strategic arsenal. For 
instance, if Indian leaders advocate building a robust nuclear arsenal as opposed to a 
bigger conventional army to deter a stronger state, then these statements likely strengthen 
the hypothesis that China, as a security threat, is the main driver of India’s nuclear 
weapons program.  
                                                 
37 Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behavior, 232. 
 11 
The same elite statements, however, could also reinforce the international prestige 
hypothesis. If a consistent message does exist that links national pride to nuclear-related 
achievements, then that may be a sign that India’s desire for great power status is a 
primary driver. To examine the international prestige hypothesis further, India’s foreign 
policy since 1998 is scrutinized. Several analysts have linked India’s advancements in its 
nuclear program with its desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,38 but 
much of this analysis remains speculative with no concrete evidence. A closer 
examination of India’s actual bid for gaining a permanent seat may reveal the answer. 
Another approach investigates the capabilities of India’s nuclear weapons 
program itself. By comparing technical achievements with those of its competitors, it can 
then be seen if specific concerns have driven India’s strategic program. For example, if 
Pakistan unveiled a new tactical nuclear weapon (TNW), did India respond with renewed 
interest in its own tactical weapons or short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)? If it 
continued to focus its efforts on long-range ICBMs, that action, combined with 
concurrent statements by political elites, would indicate India does not consider Pakistan 
as a driver for its nuclear program.  
Domestic factors can be broken down into appealing to popular demand or 
bending to pressure from scientific research agencies. By analyzing the actions of India’s 
political parties, it can be seen whether or not party platforms continue to push the 
nuclear weapons program. Another domestic factor that must be examined is the 
influence of the scientific research agencies, especially the Defence Research and 
Development Organisation (DRDO) and the DAE. If one or both organizations have seen 
a history of recent budget increases, that could indicate the extent of the agency’s 
influence and prestige.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
This thesis has determined that the strongest factor driving India’s current nuclear 
weapons program is its security fear from China, while the second strongest factor is 
India’s desire for great power status. These two factors are the primary drivers behind 
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India’s strategic arsenal. Furthermore, domestic organizations are the third strongest 
factor while India’s security fear from Pakistan is the weakest one. To reach this 
determination, the thesis devotes a chapter to each possible hypothesis broken down as 
follows: China as a security threat, Pakistan as a security threat, the desire for great 
power status, and domestic elements. Each chapter examines how strongly a particular 
factor affects India’s nuclear weapons program. Then, a conclusion wraps up by 
comparing the relative strengths of each driver and ranking its influence accordingly. The 
conclusion also examines what its findings mean for both the future of South Asian 
strategic stability, as well as implications for the United States. Before investigating the 
hypotheses, a brief overview of the program describes the growth of India’s nuclear 
weapons program that the thesis is trying to explain. 
India conducted its first atomic explosion on May 18, 1974, but it was not until it 
conducted a second round of explosions on May 11, 1998, that it became an openly 
nuclear state.39 Since that event, India has taken significant steps in creating a nuclear 
doctrine, as well as viable platforms for transforming India’s nuclear warheads into a true 
strategic arsenal. In 1999, the Indian government released a draft version of its doctrine in 
which India stated its commitment to a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence.”40 
Consistent with the idea of minimum deterrence, India also outlined its no first use 
(NFU) policy. India would not threaten non-nuclear powers and it would only conduct a 
nuclear strike if attacked by a nuclear weapon. The doctrine also stated India’s 
commitment in achieving a nuclear triad consisting of aircraft, land-based missiles, and 
sea-based assets.  
This doctrine was solidified in 2003, with the biggest change being a revision of 
NFU to include chemical and biological attacks as warranting nuclear retaliation. 
Furthermore, this retaliation would occur if such attacks occurred against Indian troops 
outside Indian soil, which many analysts have taken to mean Indian troops conducting 
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future operations in Pakistan.41 The doctrine also outlined a command and control 
program to operationalize India’s nuclear weapons better. The Nuclear Command 
Authority (NCA) would maintain overall control of nuclear weapons, and it would be 
divided into “a Political Council headed by the prime minister and Executive Council 
presided over by the national security advisor.”42 Although overall civilian authority is 
firmly established, military involvement was also outlined with the creation of the tri-
service Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which would function as the operational arm 
of the NCA. The desire for a functional nuclear triad continues to shape Indian nuclear 
forces. For instance, “in June 2012 the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, 
convened a meeting of India’s Nuclear Command Authority, which reportedly stressed 
the need for the ‘faster consolidation’ of India’s nuclear deterrence posture based on an 
operational triad of nuclear forces.”43  
In 2002, India had a stockpile of approximately 30–35 warheads.44 Within a 
decade, it has seen a vast improvement in the quantity of its arsenal. India is now 
estimated to have produced 80–100 warheads, yet it also has increased its ability to create 
more. It has a plutonium production facility near Mumbai and is planning to construct a 
second reactor near Visakhapatnam.45 Furthermore, India is also building a prototype 
fast-breeder reactor near Kalpakkam.46 Fast-breeder reactors use nuclear fission to turn 
regular uranium into plutonium, a far more suitable fuel for nuclear weapons.  
Warheads by themselves are useless without a delivery platform, and on this end, 
India has also made great strides in increasing the number and sophistication of its 
platforms. It possess the fourth largest air force in world, but only five aircraft are 
capable of conducting a nuclear strike role—the Su-30MKI, the Mig-29, the Mig-27 
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Flogger, the Mirage 2000H/TH, and the Jaguar.47 Unlike China or Russia, India does not 
have any dedicated bombers, and the range of its aircraft would be severely limited 
without air-to-air refueling or drop tanks. The Su-30MKI is undoubtedly India’s most 
capable platform, but all its nuclear-capable aircraft have recently undergone a massive 
upgrade campaign to include improvements in avionics and survivability.48 India also has 
modified some of its aircraft, such as the Su-30MKI, into carrying the BrahMos cruise 
missile (see Figure 1), which may be nuclear-capable, and thus, extends the strike range 
of its air-delivered platforms even further.49 With these modifications, India has 
drastically improved the viability of its strike aircraft as nuclear deterrents.  
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Figure 1.  SU-30MKI loaded with Brahmos cruise missile50 
India has seen the most improvement in the quality of its ballistic missiles. In 
2002, India only had one type of operational ballistic missile, the short-range Prithvi I 
with a 150 km range.51 Now, India has multiple short-range, medium-range, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles as part of its operational force. Besides the Prithvi I, 
India also possesses the Agni I, with a range of 700 km, and the medium range Agni II, 
with a range of 2,000 km.52 India’s longest-range operational missile is the Agni III, with 
a range greater than 3,000 km, which allows it to cover large parts of China.53 
Furthermore, India has successfully test launched an ICBM with the Agni V. Although 
the test launch covered 5,000 km, which is less than the internationally recognized 
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ICBM.54 In the future, India may possess a more potent capability with the Agni VI 
missile, which may include multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) 
warheads in its design.55 
The most survivable leg of a nuclear triad is a ballistic submarine, and on this 
front, India has also made much progress. Construction on the INS Arihant, India’s 
indigenous nuclear submarine, began in 1997,56 but the onboard nuclear reactor finally 
went critical in 2013,57 which marked a major milestone for this vessel in reaching 
operational status. Once underway, the submarine will likely be armed with 12 Sagarika 
K-15 missiles, although it has also been reported that India is developing a longer-ranged 
missile for the INS Arihant known as the K-4, with an estimated range of more than 
3,000 km.58 Besides a submarine, India also has a surface naval platform that utilizes a 
ballistic missile known as the Dhanush, which may be nuclear capable. Once the INS 
Arihant reaches operational status, India will have a true nuclear triad and will join an 
exclusive club of nations that only consists of the United States, Russia, and China.  
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II. CHINA AS A SECURITY THREAT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When India conducted its controversial nuclear tests in 1998, Prime Minister 
Vajpayee justified the action in a letter to President Clinton by referencing “an overt 
nuclear weapon state… which has committed armed aggression against India in 1962 
[China].”59 Before the tests, Defense Minister Fernandes made similar comments by 
classifying China as India’s strongest potential threat.60 Since 1998, no Indian leader has 
made a similarly provocative statement and both nations have engaged positively with 
one another. Nevertheless, China remains one of the strongest drivers of India’s nuclear 
weapons program. Since the Sino-Indian security dynamic is one of discrepancy, with 
China maintaining a sizeable advantage in both nuclear capability and conventional 
strength, Indian officials believe in the need for a strong strategic arsenal. Furthermore, 
this disparity has increased since 1998. Even moderate Indians who do not see China as a 
current threat want to see both the nuclear and conventional gaps narrowed before 
geopolitical change turns their northern neighbor into an adversary. At the very least, 
officials who want to justify an expansive strategic build-up can easily point to China as a 
valid reason. 
Ample evidence indicates that India has structured much of its nuclear program 
with China in mind. First, India has legitimate reasons to fear China’s growing power. 
Despite increased engagement from both countries, mutual distrust remains and the same 
territorial issues that drove the two states to war in 1962 have not been resolved. 
Perceived security gaps between the two nations are very real, as China has embarked on 
a much more comprehensive modernization program than India. Statements by political 
elites also indicate India’s desire to strengthen its strategic arsenal. Although the rhetoric 
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is split between elites who want to avoid antagonizing China and hawkish proponents 
who do not shy away from belligerent statements, both sides agree on closing security 
gaps with its much stronger neighbor. Finally, the capabilities of the nuclear weapons 
program itself seem more of a response to China than to any other threat nation. Although 
other factors, such as the desire for great power status, can also explain capability trends, 
India’s fear of China, combined with its own actions and rhetoric, indicate that China 
plays a significant, if not primary role, in affecting its nuclear weapons program.  
B. CHINA AS A THREAT? 
Two distinct threat perceptions of China in India exist, with more hawkish Indians 
viewing China as a current threat that must be deterred and moderate elements viewing 
China as a potential adversary that can be engaged.61 Yet, both factions agree that the 
Indian military must prepare against its northern neighbor. This desire for preparation 
stems from three main reasons. First, outstanding issues have yet to be resolved between 
both states, especially the territorial disputes in the Himalayas. Not only may these issues 
lead to open conflict, they also inhibit further trust building. Second, China greatly 
outclasses India in a conventional sense, and the past decade has seen this divide increase 
as China has enjoyed significant economic growth. Finally, China also outclasses India in 
a nuclear sense, which has heightened hawkish perceptions of China as “an existential 
threat from the north.”62 Hawks and moderates may disagree on engagement strategies, 
but both sides come together on the need to close both the conventional and strategic gap 
with China.  
Numerous issues have strained Sino-Indian relations. Both states are experiencing 
periods of rapid economic growth that are increasing the demands of resource 
consumption. One resource, water, may become a particular point of contention since 
most Indian rivers depend on Tibet as a source while China “is now pursuing major inter-
                                                 
61 Sidhu and Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, 145–149.  
62 Arun Prakash, “Bridging Historical Nuclear Gaps: The View from India,” in The China-India 
Nuclear Crossroads, ed. Lora Saalman (Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 
2012), 20. 
 19 
basin and inter-river water transfer projects on the Tibetan plateau.”63 Another resource, 
energy, may also lead to conflict since both states depend on increasing energy imports to 
fuel their economic growth.64 In particular, the increased demand for energy has led to 
another source of tension, China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean.65 Since 70 
percent of all Chinese oil imports depend on the Straits of Malacca, and China has 
already undertaken massive infrastructure projects in Pakistan, many Indian hawks fear 
the construction of overseas naval bases in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Pakistani 
port of Gwadar.66 Although no evidence currently confirms China’s intent to pursue such 
projects, China, for its part, remains suspicious of Indian naval intentions and fears its 
power to disrupt Chinese sea lines of communications (SLOCs).67 This situation of 
mutual distrust may lead to open conflict. Finally, the Indian people’s support for Tibet is 
another area of contention. Although India recognizes Tibet as a province of China, it 
does provide refuge to “more than 120,000 Tibetans and to the Dalai Lama” himself,68 
which has become a point of contention with Chinese leaders as they clamp down on 
Tibetan insurrection.  
One particularly incendiary flashpoint that pertains to Indian security is China’s 
covert assistance to Pakistan’s own nuclear weapons program. This assistance has been 
well documented, although the details remain shrouded in secrecy. It is very likely that 
China provided “blueprints to [an] uranium implosion device”69 and fissile material for 
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“at least two nuclear bombs.”70 China has also assisted Pakistan with its ballistic missile 
program, although countries like North Korea likely played a role as well.71 When 
Pakistan announced its Ghauri intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), Fernandes 
responded, “China is the mother of this missile.”72 Due to this extensive assistance, many 
Indian hawks have connected the Pakistani nuclear threat with China. They argue that 
Pakistan is a mere pawn in “Beijing’s encirclement strategy.”73 Furthermore, any further 
advances in Pakistan’s strategic arsenal are viewed as evidence of China’s continued 
meddling and continued threat to India via proxy.74 China’s Pakistan strategy is also 
viewed as an attempt to divert “New Delhi from its pursuit of a larger global role” by 
empowering a regional rival.75 Despite its assistance, China would likely not go to war 
on Pakistan’s behalf. When the Kashmir conflict broke out in 1999, China was careful 
not to take a strong stance on either side.76 Nevertheless, many Indians view Chinese 
assistance to Pakistan as evidence of Chinese duplicity, as well as part of a larger scheme 
to keep India tied down. This issue will likely continue to fuel distrust and hinder any 
efforts at confidence-building measures (CBMs). 
The one issue most likely to bring China and India into conflict stems from what 
Indian hawks see as an increasingly “expansionist” Chinese foreign policy.77 
Specifically, they are concerned with China’s actions in the disputed territorial zones of 
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. An actual war has already erupted over these 
disputed territories, and although violence since then has been rare, constant intrusions 
have occurred. Recently, China has embarked on a campaign of “improved infrastructure 
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in Tibet,” which has heightened “the threat perception” in the area.78 The most recent 
high-profile intrusion occurred in April 2013, in the Aksai-Chin/Ladakh region. An entire 
platoon of Chinese soldiers encamped in a disputed area for two weeks, which sparked 
anti-Chinese protests within India.79 Eventually, the issue was settled peacefully, but the 
argument over where the border should be drawn continues.80 As the two states have 
increased their military presence in both border regions, hawks view another flare-up as 
increasingly likely.81  
The border areas are also of particular interest to Indian analysts who fear a 
potential nuclear conflict with China. Many Indian military officials believe China 
possesses missiles that may be used as low-yield tactical nuclear devices, and that 
“conventional operations [in these regions] could therefore seamlessly escalate into a 
nuclear exchange.”82 Besides fears of escalation, hawkish analysts also fear potential 
nuclear war since they believe that China’s no first use policy does not apply to hostilities 
in the disputed regions.83 Since China believes the areas are Chinese territory, these 
analysts argue that it can conduct a nuclear strike on Indian forces while claiming it has 
not attacked Indian territory itself. Furthermore, hawks have argued that China has 
already deployed missiles in Tibet to target India, a claim that China has consistently 
denied.84 Although these fears of a Chinese nuclear-first strike following a conventional 
conflict seem limited to the most hawkish Indians, and in particular military officials, 
their arguments are bolstered by the strong distrust exhibited between China and India. 
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While China has nuclear de-targeting agreements with both Russia and the United States, 
it does not have any similar agreements with India.85 Also, while India has multiple 
nuclear CBMs with Pakistan, it does not have a single nuclear-related CBM with China.86 
Besides issues that could lead to potential conflict, Indian security analysts also 
worry over the capability gap with China. In both economic and conventional military 
parameters, China has become a more threatening entity since 1998. In that year, India’s 
GDP was $428.7 billion while China’s was $1.02 trillion.87 By 2013, China’s GDP had 
grown to $8.23 trillion while India’s had only grown to $1.84 trillion. The economic gap 
between the two increased by a factor of 10.88 China’s strong economic growth has 
helped fuel an increase in military spending, which also greatly outclasses India’s. In 
2013, India’s total defense budget was $46 billion89 while China’s nominal defense 
budget was $117 billion, although many analysts in the U.S. Department of Defense 
believe the number is much higher (ranging from $135 to $215 billion).90 Although 
doubts exist as to exact budget numbers, what is not in doubt is that a huge spending gap 
exists between the two states and that this gap has only increased over the years. This 
higher level of spending has ensured China’s conventional superiority over India. In 
terms of personnel, China has a smaller ground army than India with 850,000 troops 
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compared to India’s 1,100,000.91 Nevertheless, it retains a significant equipment 
advantage. China has 5,900 main battle tanks, 2,800 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 
and over 1,750 armored personnel carriers (APCs)92 while India has 1,830 main battle 
tanks, 100 IFVs, and 165 APCs.93 China retains a similar equipment advantage in the air 
force, with 1,162 combat aircraft compared to India’s 659.94 Of note, a smaller 
discrepancy exists in terms of fourth generation fighter aircraft; China has 395 while 
India has 359.95 In terms of naval strength, India has more carriers and corvettes than 
China, with two carriers compared to China’s one, and 24 corvettes compared to China’s 
11.96 China, however, retains a substantial advantage with submarines, destroyers, and 
frigates, with 65 submarines compared to India’s 14, 23 destroyers compared to India’s 
eight, and 50 frigates compared to India’s 15.97 Overall, China has more personnel with 
1,583,000 compared to India’s 1,323,000,98 and with a budget that continues to grow 
faster than India’s, this conventional discrepancy will likely continue for years to come. 
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China has also retained a sizeable advantage in the nuclear realm. Due to the 
secrecy of its strategic program, accurately gauging the trends in China’s nuclear arsenal 
is a difficult task. For instance, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimated that China had 
approximately 400 nuclear warheads in 1999,99 but after receiving additional information 
from Chinese reports, the organization downsized the arsenal to approximately 200 
warheads in 2006.100 Nonetheless, analysts like Hans Kristensen are confident that China 
is actively increasing its arsenal, with the 2008, 2010, and 2011 reports101 listing an 
increase to 240 warheads, while the latest report described another increase to 250 
warheads.102 These increases would make China the only UN permanent Security 
Council member nation actively expanding its nuclear arsenal.103 India, by contrast, has 
had a much more dramatic increase, going from 30–35 warheads in 2002104 to 80–100 in 
2011.105 Yet, despite India’s progress, China still maintains more than twice as many 
weapons. Also, China has retained its technological advantage as it modernizes its 
ballistic missiles.106 China has already deployed missiles, such as the “new DF-21 
IRBMs,” near “Da Qaidam in Qinghai Province, as well as new DF-31s in central 
China,” which can “provide coverage of major strategic targets in India.”107 In contrast, 
only one of India’s operational missiles, the Agni III, can reach deep into China and parts 
of the country remain out of reach. The Agni V can cover all of China, but it is still in the  
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testing phase. India has certainly made tremendous strides in its nuclear weapons 
program in the past decade. Nonetheless, in terms of both quantity and technological 
sophistication, China retains a strong lead.  
Not everyone in India sees China as a threat. Furthermore, these proponents have 
rightfully pointed out that in the past decade, Sino-Indian ties have been on an upward 
trend. The most dramatic example of this positive engagement has occurred in the 
economic realm, in which “trade volume increased from a paltry $260 million per year in 
1990 to $13.6 billion for 2004.”108 A decade later, trade has now reached $49.5 billion, 
and China has become India’s largest trading partner.109 Energy officials in both the 
government and commercial sectors have also come together in joint-bids, which has 
upset many predictions that competing energy demands would become a new point of 
conflict.110 Since signing a key bilateral defense initiative known as the “2005 
Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the 
India-China Boundary Question,” high-level exchanges have also occurred between 
military leaders, as well as goodwill port visits and joint participation in military 
exercises.111 Yet, for many Indians, “the past 10 years of Sino-Indian rapprochement 
have failed to alleviate India’s security concerns.”112 China still outmatches India, and if 
relations ever soured, it has the capabilities to coerce its weaker neighbor easily. 
Furthermore, many Indians agree, “India cannot hope to match Chinese capability 
without disastrous economic and political results.”113 In light of this agreement, a nuclear 
option may be the only cost-effective response. Malik argues that a “stockpile of 150–200 
20-kt warheads and their delivery systems is expected to cost about US$25 billion over 
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10 years.”114 Although that price tag is far from cheap, it is substantially smaller than the 
costs of catching up to China conventionally. Even more hawkish scholars, however, do 
not want an arms race with China since such a campaign would be far too costly. The 
goal is to achieve a credible deterrent, not nuclear parity with China. Hawks and 
moderates may disagree on whether China is a threat, but both do believe in pursuing a 
strong nuclear capability as the most prudent way to hedge against China. This goal is 
one that both pragmatists and hawks share as the only viable path to guaranteeing India’s 
safety.  
C. ELITE STATEMENTS 
Rhetoric from Indian elites has been split between officials who do not want to 
appear antagonistic towards China and leaders who are more willing to voice fears over a 
possible Chinese threat. Due to the backlash from the statements made from Prime 
Minister Vajpayee and former Defense Minister Fernandes, government officials are 
careful in their rhetoric about China. Tellis describes this strategy as part of India’s 
overall approach, which is “steady composure in New Delhi’s public statements about 
China coupled with lingering suspicion of Beijing in private.”115 Nevertheless, even 
moderate leaders have made other statements that indicate they are watching China and 
adjusting their capabilities accordingly. More hawkish elites are often more explicit in 
linking their deterrence strategy to China. Both sides agree, however, that India must 
close the capability gap with China, and furthermore, that it would be foolish to do so 
with a symmetrical strategy. Since China has a huge advantage that is only going to grow 
in the near future, India must find a different way to deter its foe than by building up its 
conventional strength. This idea of an asymmetrical strategy against China adds further 
credence that India must depend on its nuclear arsenal, which can deter China without 
matching all its capabilities.  
Since the diplomatic fallout from the 1998 tests, Indian officials have been careful 
not to antagonize China with overly aggressive statements. Once China threatened to “tilt 
                                                 
114 Malik, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” 35. 
115 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 71. 
 27 
towards Pakistan’s position on the sensitive Kashmir issue,”116 leaders in New Delhi 
soon moved to mend relations. The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Brajesh 
Mishra, stated, “India did not see China [as] an ‘enemy,’ or desire an ‘arms race’ with 
China” while President K. R. Narayanan declared, “that China did not constitute a threat 
to India, nor India a threat to China.”117 Later Indian officials have continued this policy 
of careful rhetoric. At a conference organized by the Institute of Defence Studies and 
Analysis, Indian Defense Minister, A. K. Antony, discussed how India and China have 
built up their ties and stressed that Indian’s nuclear program was not targeted against a 
particular nation.118 At the same time, he acknowledged, “We are carrying out 
continuous appraisals of its (China’s) military capabilities” and “taking all necessary 
measures to shape our responses.”119 Similarly, former Admiral Sureesh Mehta made a 
speech in which he stated that India’s strategy “to deal with China must include reducing 
the military gap.”120 He also added, “It would be foolhardy to compare China and India 
as equals,” and that India currently does not have “the intention to match China force for 
force.”121 Finally, at another conference, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon 
argued that as long as nuclear weapons exist, India has “no choice, and a responsibility 
towards our own people, to have nuclear weapons to protect them from nuclear 
threats.”122 Moderate leaders are careful not to name China as a threat, but they also 
stress the need to monitor China’s capabilities and acknowledge that a nuclear arsenal is 
necessary for India’s defense. 
Other leaders, especially those no longer tied to the government, are more willing 
to explicitly call China a threat. Shyam Saran, former Foreign Secretary, once described 
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China as “the one power which impinges most directly on India’s geopolitical space.”123 
Like Mehta, Saran also discusses the need to enhance India’s own capabilities but not 
through a matching strategy. He argues India needs to “have enough capabilities 
deployed to convince the other side that aggressive moves would invite counter-
moves”124 but also states that it would be foolish for India to try and “catch up with 
China...GDP to GDP, aircraft to aircraft, aircraft carrier to aircraft carrier.”125 Narendra 
Modi, the BJP front-runner in the 2014 election, has also taken a more hawkish stance 
towards China in a bid to differentiate himself from the incumbent, Manmohan Singh. He 
has argued that China has a “mindset of expansionism” and that a harder line is needed to 
deter them.126 Furthermore, he has stated that India’s nuclear weapons program “is 
necessary to be powerful—not to suppress anyone, but for our own protection.”127 
Moderates and hawks may disagree on whether or not to openly call China a competitor 
or adversary, but both sides agree on catching up to Chinese capabilities without 
matching them conventionally and maintaining a strong nuclear arsenal. Taken together, 
these statements indicate that Indian elites, both moderates and hawks, agree on 
enhancing the strategic arsenal as the most efficient way to guarantee India’s security 
against a nation they cannot catch up to conventionally.  
D. PROGRAM CAPABILITIES 
More than countering Pakistan, the capabilities of the Indian nuclear forces 
themselves appear tailored toward countering China. The entire trend of the program has 
steadily grown in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. In 16 years, India has created 
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approximately 100 nuclear warheads and has strengthened its ability to create more128 
while enhancing the technological sophistication of its delivery platforms. This effort is 
likely directed against a stronger nation than Pakistan. Due to Pakistan’s small 
geography, India would not need a large arsenal to decimate the entire country. China, on 
the other hand, is a much larger nation with its capital in the northeastern part of the 
country while industrial and economic targets are on the coastline. To threaten any of 
these potential targets credibly would require more technologically demanding platforms 
than short-range ballistic missiles or strike aircraft. Furthermore, China, unlike Pakistan, 
is believed to be working on a tiered ballistic missile shield comprised of its HQ-9, HQ-
16, and S-300 systems.129 To get past this system, India would need a much more 
capable strategic force than it would against Pakistan. 
One scholar, Gaurav Kampani notes, “India’s principal effort—in both the past 
decade and the current one—has been to develop land-based intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles in order to close the strategic gap with China.”130 Its most recent success has 
been the Agni V, India’s first missile that can be categorized as an ICBM.131 Although 
the missile is still in the testing phase, it can cover all of China, which greatly increases 
India’s deterrence capability (See Figure 2). Furthermore, the trend of India’s ballistic 
missile program has been to push the envelope constantly as opposed to refining its 
current arsenals. The Agni III only recently became operational while the Agni IV and 
Agni V remain in the testing phase. Recently, the DRDO announced plans for an Agni VI 
that would carry a much larger payload, which allows for the possibility of a MIRV.132 
This trend of increasing both the range and destructive power of a ballistic missile also 
appears to be tailored against China. Pakistan has been within range of India’s earliest 
ballistic missiles and MIRV weapons would be overkill against a small country that does 
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not even have a rudimentary ballistic missile shield. However, if China does set up a 
valid ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, India may view a MIRV as a necessary 
component for its strategic deterrence.  
 
Figure 2.  AGNI I, AGNI III, and AGNI V ranges compared to China133 
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India has also placed a lot of effort into building up a small fleet of nuclear 
ballistic submarines. Some analysts argue, “the planned nuclear submarine fleet with its 
short-range ballistic missiles is… Pakistan-specific,”134 since the range of the proposed 
missile, the K-15, is short compared to its land-based counterparts. Nonetheless, this 
argument assumes that India does not have plans for a more advanced submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM). India has already successfully test launched the K-
4,135 a SLBM with a range of 3,000 km, comparable to the Agni III. Furthermore, it has 
plans for an even more advanced SLBM with a 5,000 km range.136 With such ranges, 
India could easily cover strategic targets in China from deterrence patrols in the Indian 
Ocean. Once India masters its SLBM technology, a ballistic nuclear submarine would be 
as valid a deterrence against China as it would against Pakistan. 
A stronger case can be made that India’s recent air modernization program is 
designed to deter Pakistan. Due to their limited range and susceptibility to ground 
defenses, strike aircraft would be a likely platform against Pakistan, not China. 
Nevertheless, some indications demonstrate that India may intend for its air forces to also 
play a role in deterring China. First, India has recently modified some of its aircraft to 
carry the BrahMos, which is a supersonic missile strongly believed to be capable of 
carrying a nuclear warhead.137 These missiles can greatly enhance an aircraft’s striking 
range and make it more feasible to hit targets deep in Chinese territory. Furthermore, an 
air defense blog reported that the SFC asked for 40 nuclear capable strike aircraft, and 
that 40 Su-30MKIs were recently converted to carry the BrahMos cruise missile,138 
strongly indicating that these aircraft would play a role in strategic deterrence. Second, 
although more recent Su-30MKI deployments have been near Pakistan, “initial SU-30 
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MKI squadron deployments had been focused near the Chinese border.”139 It is difficult 
to ascertain if India intends for these Su-30MKIs to deter Chinese forces in a 
conventional sense or whether it intends to use them as platforms for strategic deterrence; 
whether the strike aircraft that have been deployed near China are the same ones that 
carry the BrahMos has not been confirmed. Nevertheless, the mere fact that India has 
deployed its more advanced aircraft to the Chinese border first strongly indicates that it 
prioritizes its northern neighbor as a greater threat than its western one.  
Both the ballistic missile program and the nuclear submarine program, however, 
could also be motivated by a desire for great power status. Only a handful of countries in 
the world have ballistic missile submarines. Fewer have land-based ICBMs. Only three—
the United States, Russia, and China—have both. If India is successful in 
operationalizing both the Agni V and the INS Arihant, it will join a very exclusive club. 
Furthermore, India’s desire for a nuclear triad has been a goal since its nuclear doctrine 
was first drafted in 1999. Since it was an early goal of India’s strategic community, even 
before an operational command structure was in place, India’s pursuit of a triad may be 
motivated by its desire for prestige rather than actual security concerns. Also, these 
technological achievements may be pushed by India’s defense organizations in an effort 
to prove their ability. The DRDO is behind the Agni, SLBM, and SSBN program while 
the DAE would be in charge of developing nuclear warheads that can fit either on a 
MIRV, SLBM, or ICBM platform. Both topics are explored in further depth in later 
chapters. 
E. CONCLUSION 
No smoking gun definitively points towards China as the primary driver of India’s 
nuclear weapons program. Yet, several indications demonstrate China is a strong factor in 
India’s strategic calculus. First, India has valid reasons to fear China. Not only do issues 
exist that could be the starting point for war, but China has a strong advantage in both 
conventional and nuclear forces. Pursuing a nuclear arsenal as a cheaper deterrent makes 
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sense if India decides on a strategic program of “credible, minimum” deterrence.140 As 
explained by Shyam Saran, the goal is not to catch up to China in an arms race but to 
close the gap enough so that India’s arsenal can be seen as a force that can credibly 
threaten China. Even moderates can embrace this policy since pursuing a strong nuclear 
arsenal can coexist with a policy of constructive engagement if they are careful with their 
diplomacy. Indian statements from both moderates and hawks seem to reinforce this 
strategy. Moderates are careful not to state openly that their arsenal is directed against 
China, but both groups of leaders have argued the necessity of a strong nuclear arsenal 
and of closing the capability gap with China through asymmetrical means. Finally, 
although multiple explanations may explain the trends in India’s nuclear weapons 
program, if India was focused solely on deterring China, its strategic program has taken 
all the necessary steps. Bolstering both its ballistic missile and submarine technology, as 
well as stationing cruise missile capable strike aircraft near contested areas, have all 
enhanced India’s ability to deter China. Due to both its environment, as well as its 
actions, India likely considers China one of the strongest drivers of its nuclear weapons 
program. As for China, the converse does not appear true for precisely the same reasons; 
since it maintains a strong advantage, it does not need to fear India to the same extent 
India fears China. Instead, China’s own arsenal appears to be directed against the United 
States, which maintains its own sizeable lead in both conventional and nuclear forces.141  
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III. PAKISTAN AS A SECURITY THREAT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Pakistan was created by partition in 1947, its relations with India have 
fluctuated between tension and outright hostility. The two states have fought at least four 
wars, and, most worrisome to proliferation experts in the international community, both 
states are nuclear powers. Before, and immediately after 1998, Pakistan’s nascent nuclear 
arsenal likely played a strong role in driving India’s nuclear weapons program due to the 
history of hostility between the two nations. In the past decade, however, India’s 
conventional and nuclear power have increased and Indian leaders today are confident in 
their military’s capability to respond to Pakistani provocations. Now that India has finally 
reached a point at which its ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons is assured, Pakistan 
is no longer a strong driver in India’s nuclear weapons program. 
Even though Pakistan is not as strong a driver as it used to be, India is far from 
complacent about the Pakistani nuclear threat. Many Indians view a nuclear attack from 
Pakistan as more likely than one from China, whether from escalation or nuclear 
terrorism. Nevertheless, these fears have not affected India’s nuclear weapons program. 
Instead, India has decided to respond with diplomatic measures, such as nuclear-related 
CBMs. Also, since no conventional or nuclear gap exists as it does with China, India does 
not need to modify its program to address the Pakistani nuclear threat. Notably, India’s 
Cold Start doctrine, created in response to the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the border 
standoff in 2002, indicates a desire to deal with Pakistani threats conventionally despite 
the possibility of nuclear war. Rhetoric from Indian elites also emphasizes their country’s 
capacity for massive retaliation, which indicates leadership confidence in their ability to 
deal with Pakistan. Finally, trends within India’s nuclear weapons program have not 
responded to Pakistan’s own strategy of emphasizing tactical nuclear weapons. India 
certainly does not see Pakistan as a harmless neighbor, but its own actions indicate a 
desire to deal with these particular fears through engagement and conventional strategies 
instead of any corresponding changes in its nuclear program. In terms of explaining 
India’s recent strategic trend of continued advancements, Pakistan is the weakest factor. 
 36 
B. PAKISTAN A THREAT? 
Most Indians currently see Pakistan as their country’s most threatening adversary. 
“China is seen as a relatively more responsible and predictable actor” and, like India, it 
also maintains a NFU doctrine for its nuclear weapons.142 In contrast, Pakistan has 
refused to adopt a NFU policy since it intends to use its strategic arsenal to deter any 
conventional attacks by India. Nevertheless, the strongest nuclear-related fears with 
Pakistan are escalation and nuclear acquisition by a non-state actor. Both these fears do 
not readily translate into factors that would affect India’s nuclear weapons program. After 
reaching a point at which the state had enough warheads and delivery platforms for 
assured devastation, Indian leaders have instead adopted other tactics to deal with 
Pakistan. Foremost of these measures are productive CBMs, which have helped defuse 
some of the tension of potential escalation. Also, Pakistan remains much weaker 
economically than India. Although its nuclear program is currently on par with India’s, it 
is unlikely to keep pace with Indian advancements. Unlike with China, no driving fear 
exists that India’s arsenal is not strong enough for deterrence. Genuine concern of a 
potential Pakistani nuclear strike does exist, however, but this concern has not turned into 
a driver of India’s nuclear weapons program. 
Although many Indian leaders, such as former Defence Minister George 
Fernandes, openly espouse confidence that they can prosecute a conventional war without 
triggering a nuclear conflict,143 evidence indicates that they do remain concerned about 
the possibility of escalation. Foremost of these concerns stem from Pakistan’s TNWs. As 
Kristensen notes, the new Hatf-9 short-range missile “wouldn’t threaten Indian survival 
in itself” but it “would of course mean crossing the nuclear threshold early in a 
conflict.”144 Leaders like Shyam Saran have decried this lowering of the threshold, 
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calling it “nuclear blackmail.”145 By creating a tactical delivery platform, Pakistan has 
increased the risk that a nuclear weapon would be used in the beginning stages of a 
conflict. Also, not all Indian leaders are confident that their state could avoid the problem 
of escalation. Former Director General of Military Operation, V. R. Raghavan, notes 
several factors that could turn a conventional conflict into a nuclear one, such as differing 
perceptions on the value of objectives and “deficient early warning arrangements,” which 
may send “mixed signals.”146 Sumit Ganguly also argues that the potential for mixed 
signals is heightened by the geography of the two countries. Due to the close proximity of 
the two states, a low margin for error exists; a ballistic missile could strike a major 
Pakistani or Indian city “within a span of a few minutes.”147 An inadvertent launch or 
even a false warning could easily escalate to a counterstrike.148 Yet, although fear of 
escalation has encouraged diplomatic engagement, this fear has not translated into any 
changes in India’s nuclear weapons program, even when dealing with the threat of 
TNWs. In fact, “Indian leaders have resisted pressures from their military to respond in 
kind to Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons.”149 So far, no indications 
have arisen that TNWs or any other escalation factors have affected the course of India’s 
nuclear weapons program. 
Another nuclear related fear that has not affected India’s strategic program is the 
fundamentalist threat. Indian leaders have openly voiced their fear that Pakistan’s arsenal 
may fall into terrorist hands.150 Pakistan is seen as an instable state vulnerable to Islamic 
fundamentalists who may hijack the nation into initiating conflict. For their part, Hindu 
nationalists in India have a deep-seated historical antipathy to radical Islamists, who they 
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see as “intolerant, hostile to Hindu values, proselytizing, expansionist, repressive, and 
violent.”151 This deep-seated hostility is especially strong in Kashmir,  a region in which 
Pakistani-supported insurgents and the Indian-backed government have been locked in “a 
seemingly never-ending spiral” of violence.152 India already considers Pakistan a state-
sponsor of terror due to its history of assisting separatists in the Kashmir region.153 
Furthermore, it fears the possibility that these extremists would acquire such weapons 
through security failings. Unlike other nuclear states, Pakistan must contend with an 
extreme “threat environment”154 due to its religious extremists and ethnic separatists, 
both of which have recently grown in strength. Between 2005 and 2009, “militant attacks 
on Pakistan increased nearly 800 percent” while “suicide attacks increased 
twentyfold.”155 Also, these Islamic militants have become bolder by taking up positions 
closer to cities like Islamabad.156 Even more alarming to security analysts, these militants 
have become strong enough to assault military bases directly. One such attack occurred 
on May 22, 2011, when terrorists broke into the Pakistani Naval Station Mehran.157 
Another attack occurred on August 16, 2012, when militants successfully penetrated an 
air base suspected of housing nuclear weapons at Kamra, located only 45 miles from 
Islamabad.158 If terrorists are already bold enough to attack these installations, they may 
be bold enough to steal a nuclear weapon housed there. The presence of TNWs may 
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further aggravate these risks. A warhead small enough to be used on the battlefield is 
likely more transportable and easier to steal than one mounted on a ballistic missile. 
These weapons would likely be deployed at multiple locations, “arrayed so as to cope 
with multiple potential Indian attack vectors,”159 which may make them more vulnerable 
to capture. Ironically, recent speculation that the United States or other nations may try to 
seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to secure them may also increase the risks of non-state 
actors acquiring them. Fears of U.S. seizure can “lead to larger arsenals if Pakistani 
planners conclude that dispersal and deception are insufficient,”160 but a larger arsenal 
increases the opportunities for a non-state actor to steal a nuclear warhead.  
India also fears the possibility that these strategic weapons may fall into extremist 
hands if the government itself becomes more fundamentalist. Shivshankar Menon states, 
“the real threat to nuclear weapons in Pakistan was not from fundamentalist groups, but 
from within the establishment”161 as religious extremists grow in influence. Nawaz 
Sharif’s election win in 2013 has heightened these fears since his Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz (PML-N) coalition is seen as more Islamic-leaning than the outgoing 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).162 Despite these fears, however, India has done little to 
counter Pakistan’s militant threat. This inaction is partly related to capability; recent 
strategic advancements would be of little use in stopping non-state actors. Instead, India’s 
best course of action would be to increase its counter-terrorist activities and diplomatic 
engagements with Pakistan to combat a common foe. 
Since more advanced nuclear weapons could not counter escalation or non-state 
nuclear threats, India has mostly undertaken diplomatic actions to address its Pakistani-
related fears. The most significant are the nuclear CBMs, measures which India notably 
has been unable to accomplish with China. Both Pakistan and India have engaged 
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multiple times to reduce risks related to nuclear misunderstanding and defuse the 
possibility of escalation. The first CBM was the Annual Notification of Nuclear Facilities 
at which both nations agreed to exchange “lists of nuclear installations” every year.163 In 
1999, both nations came together in a summit at Lahore to create additional nuclear-
related CBMs, which included the following: engagement in bilateral consultations, 
availability of advance notifications for ballistic missile tests, and a continued 
moratorium on further nuclear explosion tests.164 Afterwards, the Kargil Crisis disrupted 
further communication; yet, some CBMs were still conducted. Both nations continued 
ballistic launch notifications “in the spirit of Lahore and in the absence of a more 
formalized agreement.”165 After the border standoff in 2002, nuclear-related CBMs, to 
include updating hotlines and continuing the moratorium on testing, resumed in 2004.166 
Since then, both Indian and Pakistani leaders have continued nuclear-specific meetings 
and discussions with the most recent occurring in 2012, in which both nations agreed to 
extend measures to mitigate risks from nuclear accidents for another five years.167  
Also, although the risk of a nuclear strike is higher with Pakistan, “India does not 
see Pakistan as presenting an existential threat.”168 Furthermore, Indian leaders often 
view Pakistan with “feelings of superiority close to contempt.”169 In terms of strategic 
dynamics, a good reason exists for this feeling. Pakistan and India have comparable 
numbers of warheads,170 but the smaller nation lags in delivery platforms. Its longest 
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ranged operational ballistic missile is the Shaheen-2, a medium range ballistic missile 
(MRBM), which is comparable to the Agni II. Pakistan has no operational IRBMs and it 
does not have any ICBMs currently in development, while India has an operational 
IRBM (Agni III) and edges closer to an operational ICBM (Agni V). Nevertheless, due to 
its close proximity to India, Pakistan does not need a long-range missile capability for 
deterrence. It does, however, need a more survivable arsenal as a credible deterrent, and 
in this area as well, Pakistan lags behind India. Although plans are in the works to create 
an indigenous nuclear-powered submarine,171 Pakistan remains very far from the initial 
development stages while India edges closer to having an operational sea-based platform. 
Besides missiles, Pakistan also relies on strike aircraft, the F-16 and the Mirage V, with 
the F-16 being the more advanced and capable platform due to U.S.-funded upgrades.172 
Yet, Pakistan only has 63 F-16s and 65 Mirage Vs.173 In contrast, India has 88 Mig 27s, 
99 Jaguars, 56 Mig 29s, 38 Mirage 2000s, and 177 Su-30MKIs that can execute a nuclear 
strike.174 This disparity in numbers is further enhanced since the Mig 29s and the Mirage 
2000s are comparable in quality to the F-16s while the Su-30MKIs are superior. When 
factoring in all its forces, the Indian Air Force could overwhelm Pakistani defenses and 
execute a nuclear strike. While Pakistan may have a similarly sized arsenal, its delivery 
platforms lag behind in both quantity and quality.  
Furthermore, Pakistan is unlikely to close this strategic gap in the near future. In 
economic terms, Pakistan is a much weaker state. In 1998, India’s GDP was $428.7 
billion while Pakistan’s was $62.2 billion.175 By 2013, India’s GDP had grown to $1.84 
trillion while Pakistan’s grew to $231 billion; the economic gap between the two had 
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quadrupled.176 Conventional military spending has increased this disparity. In 2013, 
India’s total defense budget was $46 billion,177 which by itself is higher than Pakistan’s 
entire GDP in 1992. Also, Pakistan’s defense budget is a proportionally larger economic 
burden than India’s. In 2013, its defense budget was $8.84 billion and comprised 3.6 
percent of its GDP.178 India’s defense budget in that same year only compromised 2.26 
percent of its GDP, which made it a smaller economic burden even though it was five 
times larger.179 With such a huge gap in economic power, the gap in nuclear capabilities 
will only grow in the future. As some analysts like Michael Krepon argue, over time, 
India’s nuclear weapons program will outpace Pakistan’s by sheer virtue of its greater 
capacities.180 India has the money and the manpower to make greater headway in the 
future; Pakistan has neither.  
Oddly enough, while Indian analysts remain confident that their country will 
retain both strategic and conventional superiority, Pakistan’s weaker status actually 
heightens fears of the extremist threat. Retired Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar has argued 
that Pakistan’s “fixation with achieving military parity with India,” along with its policy 
of using fundamentalists as proxies in “Afghanistan and Kashmir,” have now “made it 
more than plausible that elements of the nuclear arsenal could well fall into extremist 
hands.”181 D. Suba Chandran states, “as India increases the distance between itself and 
Pakistan in the long-run (which will happen inevitably), the latter will engage in 
dangerous strategic calculations with its limited numbers to upset the Indian lead.”182 
India would likely win the nuclear race described by Michael Krepon, but this disparity 
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would only encourage Pakistan to engage in more reckless behavior, which in turn would 
heighten the threat of extremist elements acquiring nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the 
extremist threat has not affected India’s nuclear weapons program. Other than hoping for 
deterrence, India’s nuclear arsenal can do little against non-state actors. The weapons 
program is already strong enough to decimate Pakistan; other efforts, such as continual 
diplomatic engagements and counter-terrorist actions, are the only effective courses of 
action left. The possibility also exists of using a conventional strategy to neutralize 
militants: Cold Start. 
C. REACTIONS TO PAKISTAN: COLD START 
What prompted Cold Start were two Pakistani provocations that convinced the 
Indian military of a need for a rapid, conventional response. In May 1999, Pakistani 
troops posing as local militants crossed the line of control (LOC) and seized positions 
deep within Indian-controlled Kashmir. India responded with both ground and air attacks, 
and for the first time in history, two openly nuclear states waged a direct war with each 
other. After hundreds of casualties, and strong international pressure, both states agreed 
to an end and Pakistani forces moved back across the LOC. Despite the fear of escalation 
into a nuclear war, the aftermath actually left many Indian leaders with the impression 
that a limited conventional war could be waged successfully under a nuclear threat. 
George Fernandes stated that even under the nuclear shadow, “conventional war 
remained feasible though with definite limitations if escalation across the nuclear 
threshold was to be avoided.”183 Soon after Kargil, another event raised tensions once 
more. On December 13, 2001, five terrorists from Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e 
Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and killed six security 
personnel and a Parliamentary employee.184 Outraged, India initiated Operation 
Parakram in which 500,000 troops were mobilized near the border and several demands 
were made to Pakistan, such as arresting the leaders of LeT and JeM, and curbing their 
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financial networks.185 Pakistan also increased its troop presence at the border, and for a 
tense period of time, two enormous armies squared off over the LOC, as well as the rest 
of the Pakistani-Indian boundary. Despite fears over another possible escalation into 
nuclear war, once more, diplomatic pressure resolved the standoff.  
Despite the peaceful resolution of the border standoff in 2002, the Indian military 
was frustrated that it was unable to mount a “swift military response” before international 
pressure ended the conflict.186 This frustration created pressure for a change in Indian 
military doctrine. Cold Start would enable rapid mobilization of conventional Indian 
forces to execute punitive actions in the event of another crisis, which could include 
attacks from Pakistani-based non-state actors. This rapid mobilization would be achieved 
in two ways, “moving Strike Corps cantonments closer to the border” and creating 
“integrated battle groups (IBGs)” that would combine infantry, artillery, and armor 
elements to ensure sufficient firepower.187 Not only would Indian forces have enough 
strength to punch through Pakistani lines, they would also hold newly captured Pakistani 
territory until a settlement could be reached, which would be achieved without crossing 
the nuclear threshold. The goal would be to wage a “limited war under the nuclear 
umbrella against Pakistan.”188  
Significantly, Cold Start implies that India is confident in both its regular and 
strategic advantages to rely on a conventional attacking force despite the threat of a 
nuclear response. This doctrine does not mean India finds Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to be 
an empty threat. The premise of Cold Start is to avoid triggering Pakistani nuclear red 
lines. Yet, the fact that India believes it can successfully wage a rapid, limited offensive 
indicates a strong certainty in its conventional superiority. The doctrine also depends on 
Indian assurance in its own strategic advantages; India’s nuclear weapons are strong 
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enough to deter a Pakistani nuclear response even in the face of invasion, which raises the 
redlines to a point at which a limited conflict can be waged. Arguably, these beliefs are 
misguided and could result in an incident in which misperception enables nuclear 
conflict. Nevertheless, the conventional strategy of Cold Start demonstrates that India has 
strong confidence in its ability to deal with Pakistan. This confidence is at odds with a 
nuclear program that continues to push the envelope in technological improvements. 
Furthermore, Gaurav Kampani notes that the conventional strategy of Cold Start, which 
attempts to wage limited war under a nuclear umbrella, seems to be at odds with India’s 
declared nuclear strategy of massive retaliation.189 This seeming contradiction can be 
explained by India’s certainty in both its conventional and nuclear forces. India is so 
assured by its superior firepower that it believes it can do both, wage a limited war and 
promise unlimited retaliation as well. Unlike China, a state that has both a conventional 
and nuclear advantage over India, Pakistan is seen to be weak enough to be vulnerable to 
the conventional strategy of Cold Start.  
D. ELITE STATEMENTS 
Statements from Indian elites also reinforce the belief that India’s arsenal is strong 
enough to deal with Pakistan, although they also portray a narrative in which Pakistan is 
viewed as a potentially irresponsible nuclear power. Leaders consider Pakistan an 
irresponsible nuclear power for multiple reasons. Former Indian Army Chief Deepak 
Kapoor stated that Pakistan is a proliferation threat since it had gone “well beyond the 
degree of deterrence” as it continues to build up its arsenal.190 Shyman Saran lambasted 
the Pakistani military’s control of its nuclear assets since the “military’s perceptions are 
not fully anchored in a larger national political and economic narrative.”191 Furthermore, 
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he criticizes Pakistan’s pursuit of TNWs, which he characterized as “nuclear blackmail, 
no different from the irresponsible behavior one witnesses in North Korea.”192 
Nevertheless, despite Pakistan’s perceived irresponsible behavior, Indian leaders 
remain confident that they can adequately deal with this threat through the promise of 
massive retaliation. During the border standoff in 2002, Army Chief General Sunderajan 
Padmanabhan promised that “should any nuclear weapons be used against Indian 
forces… the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished, and so severely that 
their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful.”193 George Fernandes, 
former defense minister, put it more bluntly when he warned that Pakistan would “get 
itself destroyed and erased from the world map” should it resort to using nuclear 
weapons.194 Shyam Saran clarified that any distinctions between strategic or tactical 
nuclear weapons is “irrelevant,” and promised nuclear retaliation for even battlefield use 
of a TNW.195 Further reinforcing India’s belief in its own arsenal is the fact that the state 
has never deviated from its adherence to NFU even in the face of strong provocation. 
While accusing Pakistan of nuclear blackmail, Fernandes also added, “India would not be 
‘impulsive’ and would stick to its No-First Use policy.”196 Although speculation has 
arisen that the BJP may attempt to revise this policy if it regains power,197 these fears 
recently turned out to be groundless, as newly elected Prime Minister Modi promised no 
change to the policy.198  
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E. CAPABILITIES 
Several scholars believe that India’s nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s 
was only renewed when it became alarmed at how fast Pakistan’s own program had 
advanced.199 Although fears over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may have been the original 
impetus for India’s nuclear weapons program, the program’s current trend does not 
appear to be tailored against Pakistan. By 2002, India had begun production of the Agni 
II, which had sufficient range and power to cover all of Pakistan (see Figure 3).200 Since 
that year, however, it has continued to work on new projects with capabilities that have 
little use against Pakistan, especially long-range ballistic missiles. Other systems that 
may be useful against Pakistan could also be explained by other factors, such as security 
fears from China or the desire for great power status. For instance, India has made 
significant strides towards a viable anti-ballistic missile shield to include successful 
launches of the Prithvi Air Defense missile (PAD) and the lower range but hypersonic 
advanced air defense missile.201 If successful, this program would be equally valuable 
against China as it would be against Pakistan. Furthermore, the successful creation of a 
ballistic missile shield would also add to the nation’s prestige. Due to its cost and 
complexity, very few nations have engaged in an active missile defense program.202 
Although Pakistan has discussed acquiring MIRV technology, this move is seen as a 
counter to India’s proposed BMD system, which is already in development.203 
Furthermore, Pakistan has recently moved towards emphasizing TNWs, weapons against 
which a BMD system would be less useful. If Pakistan continues its trend of acquiring 
TNWs, then arguably, a BMD would actually be more useful as a counter towards China, 
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which is more likely to attack India with long-range ballistic missiles. Some analysts 
believe India’s short-range Prahaar missile is a response to Hatf-9,204 but no proof exists 
that the Prahaar will be nuclear-capable, and Indian leaders seem set on responding to 
TNWs as they would against any nuclear attack, with massive strategic retaliation.205 
Pakistan is also unlikely to be a driver of India’s ballistic missile program, which 
remains focused on increasing both the range and payload. With a reduced payload, the 
Agni I can reach 1,200 km, which is enough to cover all of Pakistan.206 The Agni II, with 
a 2,000 km range, is more than enough to deter Pakistan in any scenario (see Figure 3). 
Yet, instead of refining and consolidating these missile systems, India has been on a path 
for continued range increases with the Agni III at 3,500 km and the Agni V at 5,000 km. 
Also, no need exists to increase the payload to devastate Pakistan completely. As Amit 
Gupta notes, “an Indian attack that decimated Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi would 
essentially leave Pakistan with an economy and society that is in the 19th century.”207 It 
is not necessary to destroy more than a few cities to decimate India’s smaller neighbor. 
Yet, the DRDO recently announced plans for an Agni VI that would carry a much larger 
warhead, which allows the possibility of MIRV.208 Such improvements would be overkill 
for Pakistan, and would be better explained by either security fears over China or a desire 
for international prestige.  
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Figure 3.  AGNI II range compared to Pakistan 209 
Many see improvements in strike aircraft and India’s pursuit of a nuclear ballistic 
submarine as Pakistan-specific, since the limited range of both platforms would seem to 
preclude their use against China. Nevertheless, while India has deployed its most 
advanced strike fighter, the Su-30MKI, closer to the Pakistani border,210 it only started 
doing so after it had already deployed three separate squadrons close to the Chinese 
border along the Himalayas.211 This deployment pattern indicates that India prioritizes 
defending against China rather than Pakistan. Also, a ballistic nuclear submarine, which 
is the most survivable form of nuclear deterrence, would be equally useful against China 
as it would against Pakistan if India manages to obtain a long-range SLBM. The DRDO 
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is already hard at work at obtaining such a missile with the K-4.212 Furthermore, the 
desire for prestige may also explain India’s pursuit of a ballistic submarine, since very 
few nations can lay claim to this achievement. The threat of Pakistan by itself does not 
necessarily explain India’s development of its air-delivered and submersible nuclear 
platforms. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Rajesh Rajagopalan has argued that the past decade saw a rapid increase in 
India’s modernization to ensure an adequate deterrent against Pakistan, but since that has 
been achieved, India will likely focus its efforts on deterring China.213 In terms of threat 
perception, India does fear Pakistani nuclear power, specifically, the potential for 
escalation or a non-state attack. Yet, these fears have not translated into any changes in 
India’s nuclear weapons program. Instead, India has sought to address these fears with 
diplomatic efforts, such as nuclear-related CBMs. Furthermore, currently, no capability 
gap exists that would explain India’s desire to have a much stronger program. The 
conventional strategy of Cold Start, which relies on having an overwhelming advantage 
in both conventional and nuclear capabilities, actually indicates an Indian belief in its 
own superiority compared to Pakistan. This perception then does not match up with a 
nuclear weapons program that continues to push the envelope in ability. Also, the 
program itself has no response to Pakistan’s new strategy of TNWs. Due to its 
advantages, the mismatch between program trends and Pakistan’s own strategic 
trajectory, and nuclear threats that cannot be answered by a more capable strategic force, 
India likely does not see Pakistan as a strong driver of its nuclear weapons program. The 
converse is not true. Analysts in both countries agree that Pakistan is mostly motivated by 
its need to deter India.214 Ironically, India fears Pakistan’s attempt to catch up more than 
Pakistan’s actual nuclear ability, since it believes this spending leaves the state more 
vulnerable to extremist non-state actors. Nevertheless, the possibility that both states can 
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conduct joint action against a common foe remains remote as strong distrust and 
antagonism remains, a distrust that continues to be fueled by Pakistan’s desire to catch up 
while India races ahead due to other factors. 
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IV. THE DESIRE FOR GREAT POWER STATUS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When India first conducted its successful nuclear tests, then Prime Minister Atal 
Vajpayee bragged that India “has a big bomb now.”215 For many analysts, India’s nuclear 
weapons program was motivated more by a desire for great power status than by any 
security fears. This theory is especially popular in Pakistan and China, where officials 
denounce India’s security claims as nonsensical since China has a NFU doctrine and 
Pakistan has a far weaker military.216 Although these claims ignore the valid security 
fears Indian officials have, the desire for great power status remains a potent factor 
behind India’s nuclear weapons program, which makes it the second strongest driver. As 
long as India is not considered a world-class nuclear power, it likely will continue to 
pursue certain technical milestones, such as ICBM capabilities. Nevertheless, this driver 
is secondary to security fears from China, especially due to several organizational 
changes that indicate security concerns have become more prominent since 1998. 
Despite initially facing sanctions from its 1998 tests, the past decade has seen 
growing acceptance of India as a nuclear power. Nevertheless, India has been unable to 
join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear weapon state and some 
nations continue to question the legitimacy of India’s nuclear weapons program. To 
counteract this reputation, India has embarked on a campaign to demonstrate it is a 
responsible nuclear power, but part of that campaign relies on enhanced capabilities to 
heighten its credibility. To be taken more seriously as a nuclear power, India will 
continue to pursue advanced nuclear-related technology to drive its strategic program 
forward. Elite statements also indicate a desire to break into an exclusive club, whether 
that is as a nuclear power or as a newly ICBM-capable nation. These statements 
demonstrate that the strong nationalism, which propelled India into an openly nuclear 
state, still exists as support for its newer programs. Also, in terms of capabilities, the 
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program has followed guidelines put in place before any security considerations, 
especially the doctrinal desire for a nuclear triad. Although this evidence indicates that 
the desire for status is a strong driver for India’s nuclear weapons program, other 
evidence demonstrates that this driver has become secondary to security concerns. Many 
elite statements continue to stress the primacy of addressing security fears. Also, nuclear 
weapons are no longer just a status item for India. Since 2003, India has taken strides to 
operationalize its nuclear force and make it more responsive to security fears. 
Furthermore, India has attempted to leverage other factors, such as demographics or its 
growing economy, as justifications in its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. Before 1998, security concerns and the desire for prestige may have been 
roughly equivalent in influencing India’s nuclear weapons program. Due to recent 
changes in doctrine and organization, however, security fears over China have become a 
stronger driver. 
B. RESPONSIBLE BUT RISING NUCLEAR POWER 
Contrary to many predictions, India has made great strides towards being seen as 
a legitimate nuclear power since 1998. The civil nuclear deal with the United States, in 
particular, helped elevate India’s image as a responsible nuclear state. Nonetheless, India 
has not achieved complete acceptance. Several nations either refuse to engage with India 
as a nuclear peer or continue to pressure the nation to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear 
weapon state. To counter this environment and gain full acceptance, India has embarked 
on a campaign in which it attempts to demonstrate that it is a responsible nuclear power. 
Part of this campaign involves increasing its capabilities to gain better credibility. By 
improving its technology so that it gains ICBMs and other advanced platforms, India 
could make a better claim as a serious nuclear power, which makes it more attractive as a 
partner in non-proliferation institutions. Furthermore, India can create a record of non-
proliferation by investing in advanced technology and then demonstrating its 
commitment to keeping that technology within the country. As India pushes for stronger 
acceptance, it likely will continue to pursue strong modernization to solidify its status as 
a true nuclear weapons state. 
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Immediately after the 1998 tests, India faced widespread censure. “Far from 
winning an invitation to a permanent seat in the Security Council,” the South Asian 
nation “came close to being labeled a pariah state.”217 Nevertheless, Indian officials 
predicted they would face such a reaction and “after studies showed its economy was 
strong enough to survive without foreign aid,” decided “to go it alone.”218 Soon, their 
prediction of eventual acceptance appeared to pay off as sanctions and international 
pressure lifted only a few years after the tests. Foremost among the accepting nations was 
the United States, which reached out to both India and Pakistan as vital allies in the War 
on Terror.219 Later on, relations between the two nations went on a new upswing with the 
2008 Civil Nuclear Deal. The United States pushed for this deal due to a changed 
strategic calculus, which is “in part owing to reforms within India and its increasing 
economic power, in part owing to a changed international context since 9/11.”220 India, 
on the other hand, saw numerous advantages in having access to foreign technology and 
foreign uranium supplies.221 Regardless of motivation, one of the main consequences of 
the civil nuclear deal was changing India’s nuclear status from international pariah to 
near universal acceptance. Many analysts described the deal as “recognition of reality” 
that India is a nuclear power and would not be giving up its weapons.222 As proof of this 
recognition, India did not face widespread censure for its recent Agni V testing.223 This 
recognition is in stark contrast to Amit Gupta’s prediction in 2001, who claimed that 
India’s nuclear program would be minimalist since “even advancing to a second-tier  
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status would cause concern in the international community and lead to both military and 
economic reprisals.”224 No such reprisal occurred even after India demonstrated its new 
capacity to strike far beyond its borders.  
Yet, India has not achieved universal recognition. China, in particular, refuses to 
acknowledge India as a legitimate nuclear power. It was the last holdout in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant an exception for the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, and 
has actively blocked India’s attempt to gain membership to the NSG since then.225 Its 
officials “tend to avoid direct statements about India’s nuclear forces,”226 but when 
pressed for bilateral discussions, they cite both India’s status as a non-nuclear power in 
the NPT, as well as India’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) as reasons to refuse further talks.227 For its part, Indian elites find China’s 
“reluctance to thus acknowledge India as a nuclear peer” particularly rankling.228  
Besides China, other nations have also resisted viewing India as a legitimate 
nuclear power. Japan has “always felt uncomfortable with India’s status as a non-
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).”229 Negotiations for a 
civil nuclear deal between the two nations have been ongoing since 2010,230 and the 
biggest hurdle appears to be India’s status as a non-signatory member. A similar tension 
exists with Australia, with which “differences over the NPT and uranium exports remain 
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a major thorn in the bilateral relationship.”231 Recently, however, both nations have 
engaged constructively in their own civil nuclear deal, although much like the deal with 
Japan, it has yet to be finalized.232 The fact that both nuclear deals with Japan and 
Australia have taken so long indicate that both states continue to view India as a less than 
legitimate nuclear power, mainly due to its status as a non-signatory of the NPT. 
India has voiced an interest in joining the NPT,233 but one of the provisions of the 
treaty restricts nuclear weapon status to nations that “manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.”234 Since 
India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, it can only join as a non-nuclear weapon 
state, a restriction that it has consistently rejected. Instead, India has attempted to enhance 
its legitimacy by embarking on a campaign to portray itself as a responsible nuclear 
power. In this narrative, India has emphasized its “immaculate record in preventing any 
proliferation, its willingness to act as a responsible nuclear weapons’ power through No-
First-Use commitments, and its democratic credentials.”235 India has halted additional 
nuclear tests, despite not being a signatory to the CTBT. Also, it has attempted to gain 
entry to the four export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group.236 
By joining these organizations, India hopes to burnish its image as a responsible nuclear 
power, as well as “a regime upholder”237 of the nuclear status quo.  
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In this context, India’s desire for great power status plays a key role in India’s 
desire for nuclear legitimacy. By enhancing its own capabilities, India gains a much more 
credible voice as it attempts to join nuclear-related associations and gain full acceptance 
as a nuclear power. Sumit Gupta describes this dynamic as an issue of “international 
currencies of power.”238 More than just having a nuclear weapon, a state needs the 
delivery platform and other associated capabilities to be seen as an actual power. Without 
the power to project its nuclear capabilities extra-regionally, this lack of credibility 
“imposes major constraints on India’s ability to be treated as a serious nuclear power 
within the international system”239 and India would be viewed “as a third-tier nuclear 
power.”240 Gupta notes that an ICBM program in particular “would also allow [India], in 
theory, to be a key player when it comes to discussing and formulating new arms control 
regimes.”241 By pursuing enhanced capabilities concurrently with its campaign to be seen 
as a responsible nuclear power, India can enhance its own image. India’s pursuit of 
status, therefore, plays a pivotal role in its search for legitimacy, and thus, the desire for 
great power status continues to be a major driver of its nuclear weapons program. 
This relationship between capability and credibility can be seen in certain 
statements made by Indian leaders and analysts. In a joint statement between President 
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, both leaders stressed India’s 
position as “a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” as justification for the 
civil nuclear deal.242 Since India already possesses “advanced nuclear technology,” its 
credibility as a responsible partner is greater than it would be otherwise. David Fidler and 
Sumit Ganguly argue that bringing India into the NPT would benefit the cause of non-
proliferation since “with India supporting the regime, the world would finally have all 
nuclear-armed great powers committed to the same rules—an unprecedented 
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convergence that could reinvigorate non-proliferation politics in a manner more 
meaningful than the distant vision of a world without nuclear weapons.”243 Implicit in 
their argument is that India already is a great power; it has status and authority that would 
strengthen the NPT. More than just responsibility, India adds legitimacy because it is a 
growing nuclear weapons power. By continuously pursuing technological sophistication 
in its strategic arsenal, India increases pressure on other nations to let it into associations. 
If India does reach the capabilities of other great nuclear powers, yet remains excluded, 
the credibility of organizations like the NPT would decrease.  
In a roundabout way, India could also use its increased capabilities as a platform 
to prove its legitimacy as a responsible nuclear power. For instance, by creating ballistic 
missile technology and then making a point about not exporting them, India creates a 
record of nonproliferation. When India drafted its own domestic weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) bill, it made a point of how this bill prohibits the transfer of both 
nuclear technology, as well as delivery mechanisms.244 Obviously, merely possessing 
increased capability does not increase a state’s legitimacy. Advancements in North 
Korea’s ballistic missile technology have certainly not made it more legitimate in the 
eyes of the international community. In addition to its status as a democratic nation, 
however, India could add a record of nonproliferation that it can create in conjunction 
with its advanced capabilities. This record can exert significant pressure on the rest of the 
world for letting it become a truly accepted nuclear power. By becoming a significant 
nuclear state, India could then be seen as a responsible one as well.  
C. ELITE STATEMENTS 
Some elite statements also support the argument that the desire for great power 
status continues to be a strong factor in motivating India’s strategic arsenal. These 
statements can be broken down into two categories. Some statements, from both Indian 
leaders and the media, express satisfaction at breaking into an elite club of nations after 
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achieving certain technical feats, such as a successful ICBM launch. Other statements, in 
keeping with the strong national pride extolled by the BJP prior to the 1998 tests, 
emphasize how these achievements were indigenous and completely homegrown. Both 
indicate that a desire for status continues to drive nuclear-related achievements. 
Nevertheless, some Indian elites continue to emphasize security fears and directly 
challenge the prestige arguments.  
Much like former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s declaration that India “has a big 
bomb now,”245 several Indian leaders have continued the trend of praising their state’s 
newly found entrance into an exclusive group. When India successfully test launched its 
Agni V ICBM, BJP President Nitin Gadkari stated, “The fully indigenous missile Agni-V 
has put India in the elite club of nations.”246 DRDO Chief V. K. Saraswat continues the 
theme of an elite club by remarking, “the Agni-V compares favourably with ICBMs in 
use by nuclear weapons states like Britain, China, France, Russia and the U.S.”247 After 
the successful launch of the SLBM K-15, the DRDO scientists involved with the project 
declared, “India has joined an elite group of nations capable of lofting nuclear missiles 
from air, land and sea.”248 
Media reports also reinforce the theme of finally breaking into an elite association 
when discussing nuclear-related achievements. Immediately after the 1998 tests, David 
Kinsella and Jugdep S. Chima analyzed several media reports and observed “an apparent 
preoccupation with what it takes to become a member of the ‘superleague’, ‘rarefied 
strata’, or ‘exclusive club’ of nation-states.”249 This same preoccupation with an 
“exclusive club” has continued with media reports today. Much like Indian leaders, news 
media reports boasted about joining a select ICBM club with the successful Agni V test 
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launch.250 The media also hyped up reports about the proposed Agni VI with MIRV 
capability. Although the missile is nowhere close to the testing phase, news articles 
discussed how achieving MIRV capability would again put India in an exclusive club.251 
When the INS Arihant’s reactor went critical, one article described how this event “has 
enabled India to join a select club of nations like the US, Russia, China, the UK and 
France.”252 
Other statements focus more on the indigenous part of the achievement. Instead of 
discussing how India has achieved feats on an international scale, these statements 
emphasize the fact that much of this accomplishment occurred due to their country’s own 
ingenuity. After the first successful test of the Agni V, Lok Sabha Speaker Meira Kumar 
called it, “a major leap forward in India’s missile technology and military deterrent 
capabilities.”253 As soon as the nuclear reactor onboard the INS Arihant activated, former 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that it was a “giant stride in the progress of our 
indigenous technological capabilities.”254 Defence Minister A. K. Antony also chimed in 
with praise, describing it as “a very important milestone in the nation’s journey towards 
self-reliance in critical areas.”255 
Yet, many statements are still made by Indian leaders who remain adamant that 
India’s nuclear weapons program is driven by security fears. Indian National Security 
Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, argued that since India lives in a world with nuclear 
weapons, it has “no choice, and a responsibility towards [its] own people, to have nuclear 
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weapons to protect them from nuclear threats.”256 Shyam Saran, former Foreign 
Secretary, goes even further in justifying India’s program as a necessary action to address 
India’s security fears. He states that India’s program was the product of “an increasingly 
complex and hostile security environment,”257 but he also categorically rejects the great 
power status argument. Arguing that the great power status argument “does not square 
with facts,” Saran continues to declare that India’s security environment, as well as the 
steps it has taken to operationalize its nuclear force, demonstrate that security fears are 
paramount over any prestige considerations.258  
D. CAPABILITIES 
Shortly after the 1998 tests, India released a draft of its nuclear doctrine. Besides 
outlining its objective of maintaining “credible minimum nuclear deterrence,” India 
declared that it would have a “triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based 
assets.”259 India did not even have a clear command structure in place, besides an 
emphasis on civilian leadership, yet the state already decided that a triad was necessary. 
This early timing suggests that a desire for prestige drove this requirement more than any 
actual military concerns. Furthermore, India has not wavered from its goal. It has made 
tremendous progress in operationalizing both an ICBM and a ballistic missile submarine, 
while also upgrading its aircraft to extend their strike range. These changes have all 
directly addressed the shortcomings raised by Sumit Gupta, who argued that India could 
only be a “third-tier” nuclear power since its nuclear forces “cannot be deployed or used 
to project power beyond the immediate South Asian region.”260 By investing in ICBM 
and SLBM technology while increasing the range of its strike aircraft, India has 
addressed the power projection issues that kept it a regionally focused nuclear power. 
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Furthermore, a viable triad would certainly catapult India into a top-tier nuclear power 
since only three other nations can lay claim to this achievement. 
A security-based argument, however, can be made for each of India’s nuclear 
capabilities. Due to the great distances involved, the only credible way India could deter 
China would be with an ICBM. A ballistic missile submarine is the most survivable form 
of nuclear deterrence, which makes it a valuable tool against both Pakistan and China. 
Also, although MIRV capabilities and a BMD shield seem excessive, Shyam Saran 
argues that “both enhance the survivability of assets and the credibility of India’s nuclear 
doctrine.”261 By enhancing the survivability of India’s arsenal, both a MIRV-capable 
missile and a BMD shield make it a much viable deterrent even in the event of a first 
strike by an adversary. Although the 1999 doctrine may indicate the desire for status was 
a strong factor in driving a nuclear triad at that time, India’s nuclear weapons program 
has undergone several doctrinal and organizational changes that now indicate security 
concerns have become a stronger driver, even over the desire for great power status. 
E. WHY PRESTIGE IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN SECURITY 
Although the desire for great power status remains a strong driving force, changes 
in India’s doctrine indicate it now prioritizes security fears over prestige. India has taken 
significant strides towards operationalizing its nuclear force and making it combat ready. 
Part of this change includes giving greater control to the military and putting nuclear 
forces at a higher level of readiness. Both developments indicate that security fears are 
now paramount in shaping India’s strategic program. Evidence also indicates that India 
does not see its nuclear power as prestigious as other factors. Notably, India has not 
leveraged its status as a growing nuclear state in its bid to become a permanent member 
of the UN Security Council. Since India uses other attributes in its campaign for great 
power status and it has taken concrete steps to address security fears, the security threat 
appears more potent as a driving force than prestige. 
Many proponents of the great power status argument point out that poor 
coordination has occurred between the military and the bureaucratic bodies responsible 
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for the nuclear arsenal. Amrita Narlikar notes that the nuclear policy is “closely guarded 
between the Prime Minister, the Department of Atomic Energy (which includes the 
Atomic Energy Commission) and the Defence Research and Development Organization; 
the inputs and influence of the Ministry of Defence in this critical security area have been 
very limited.”262 Due to this poor coordination, they argue that nuclear weapons must be 
prestige items only, since the institution responsible for India’s defense plays a small role 
in policy and has little input. In response, Shyam Saran has argued that this belief is an 
untrue characterization, and that India’s actual record “demonstrates quite clearly a 
sustained and systematic drive to operationalize various components of the nuclear 
deterrent in a manner best suited to India’s security environment.”263 He further states 
that the military may seem shut out due to strict civilian control, which is a necessity 
since “the very nature of nuclear deterrence as practised by a civilian democracy dictates 
that decisions relating to the nature and scope of the arsenal, its deployment and use, be 
anchored in the larger architecture of democratic governance.”264  
India’s history of nuclear control supports Saran’s argument. From the beginning 
of the program, “the military has progressively achieved greater control over India’s 
nuclear weapons.”265 Harsh Pant notes that India has been well aware of the need for a 
strong command and control element to ensure proper use of its strategic arsenal. In 
response to these criticisms, India finally established a National Command Authority, and 
the “armed forces, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, are well represented on 
this council.”266 Furthermore, “a proper command has been established, with the flow of 
command from the PM [Prime Minister] to NSA [National Security Advisor] to 
CDS/Chairman COSC [Combined Defence Services/Chairman of Chief of Staff 
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Committee] to C-in-C SFC [Commander in Chief for Strategic Forces Command].”267 
The SFC in particular was created to “instill greater coordination and joint planning 
between the services.”268 Since 2005, its “organizational presence within India’s nuclear 
planning has grown substantially” with staff strength nearly twice the size of a 
conventional operational command.269 Critics rightfully point out that much work still 
remains in finalizing the command and control structure to include rectifying “inherent 
tensions” and fixing “loose ends.”270 Nevertheless, India has undeniably made significant 
progress in turning its strategic arsenal into a viable force.  
Evidence also exists that the military is at a higher state of readiness for its 
nuclear forces than previously believed. M.V. Ramana notes that the military had been 
“purchasing components of an early warning system” to include a Green Pine radar from 
Israel.”271 This radar system would be essential for detecting incoming ballistic missile 
launches, and thus, enabling a quicker response. From interviews with former SFC 
officials, Vipin Narang discovered that “India, while adhering to its posture of assured 
retaliation, has increased the baseline readiness of at least a subset of its nuclear forces, if 
not all of them.”272 This increased readiness comes from “encapsulated” or “canisterized” 
systems “in which the warhead is likely pre-mated to the delivery vehicle and kept 
hermetically sealed for storage and transport,” a process only possible now that India has 
largely moved to solid-fueled ballistic missiles.273 Although both Ramana and Narang 
fear this heightened readiness may lead to easier escalation, if true, it would also be 
evidence that security fears, as opposed to the desire for great power status, have become 
a stronger driver of India’s nuclear weapons program.  
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Several analysts have linked India’s nuclear weapons program with its desire for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.274 Yet, Indian officials have mostly focused 
their arguments for a seat on being “the world’s largest democracy, the second most 
populous nation, and a consistent contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.”275 In 
particular, officials often stress the demographic argument. With 1.2 trillion people, India 
alone comprises 17 percent of the total world population.276 I. K. Gujral, a member of 
India’s Parliament, argues that if the UN is “as democratic as it pretends to be,” it should 
include the South Asian nation to reflect “the world’s population” more accurately.277 
Indian officials have also emphasized their nation’s “economic potential.”278 Currently, 
India’s GDP is the tenth largest in the world,279 but several economists have predicted 
that it will become the third largest GDP by 2030 and may come close to matching the 
United States by 2050.280 Furthermore, India is in a strong position for future growth 
since it has a “barely tapped market and a cheap labor force of potentially gigantic 
proportions.”281 While both the demographic and economic arguments are repeatedly 
stressed in a bid for a permanent seat, no Indian officials have ever brought forth the 
nuclear argument, even as a sign of their nation’s increasing technological sophistication. 
India could certainly enhance its bid as it acquires both ICBM and SLBM technology, 
since the other permanent members have one or both systems. Yet, even with the recent 
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success of the Agni V, India has continued to focus on other factors, which may indicate 
that the relationship between the desire for great power status and its nuclear weapons 
program is not as strong as originally believed. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The desire for great power status remains a strong factor in driving India’s nuclear 
weapons program, but it is still secondary to security fears from China. This driver will 
remain strong as long as universal recognition of its legitimacy as a nuclear power has 
not been achieved. Mira Kamdar notes that India has finally “rid itself of the great 
humiliation of exclusion from the ultimate power bloc of the world’s official nuclear 
powers,”282 but it still has some ground to cover before every nuclear state considers it a 
peer. Besides expounding on how it is a responsible nuclear power, India has been 
pursuing enhanced capabilities as a way to bolster its credibility and create a record of 
responsibility. Certain statements from elites also indicate a desire to enter “a select club 
of nations.”283 Finally, India’s program itself started with a desire for a triad before 
establishing strategic requirements. While security fears may explain India’s desire to 
acquire ICBMs, SLBMs, and MIRV technology, all these systems are also prestigious 
items that would greatly enhance India’s national stature as a nuclear power. Yet, 
evidence also exists that demonstrates security concerns have become a stronger factor 
relative to the desire for prestige since 1998. Some elite statements specifically prioritize 
security fears over the desire for status. Also, India’s recent operationalization drive to 
include greater input from the military, as well as heightened readiness, indicates a shift 
towards addressing security concerns. India’s own foreign policy, which has leveraged its 
demographic and economic advantages in its bid for a permanent seat, also weakens the 
status argument. Although it is likely that India’s desire for status will continue to play a 
role in shaping its nuclear weapons program, at least until it gains universal recognition  
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as a nuclear power, organizational changes and India’s recent foreign policy indicate that 
security fears over China have overtaken the desire for great power status as the strongest 
driver. 
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V. DOMESTIC FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For several analysts, domestic organizations are the strongest drivers of India’s 
nuclear weapons program. In their view, these organizations used strong internal pressure 
to drive the program in a way that furthered their agendas, such as increased support. 
Political parties used nuclear weapons to bolster their popularity and divert attention 
away from other domestic issues. Scientific organizations used the program as a path to 
enhance their own credentials and prove to the world that their technical abilities rivaled 
that of great powers to justify their autonomy and budgetary increases. According to 
many accounts of India’s nuclear history, these domestic factors were essential in 
pushing India from a posture of ambiguity to openly declaring its nuclear status. Yet, in 
the post-1998 world, these forces have weakened in potency. Due to political 
consequences and organizational changes, both political parties and scientific institutions 
have seen a decrease in their ability to drive India’s nuclear weapons program.  
The two relevant factors behind India’s nuclear weapons program are political 
parties, specifically the BJP, and scientific organizations. The BJP may have played a 
crucial role in India’s nuclear policy before 1998, but recent evidence indicates a 
curtailment of that role. First, politicians have become more hands-off with nuclear 
policy, since achievements in that field do not translate into electoral success. The Indian 
population remains far more focused on other issues. Second, no huge difference exists 
between the two major party coalitions when it comes to nuclear policy, which also 
indicates that politicians play a limited role in driving it. Scientific agencies, namely the 
DAE and the DRDO, remain key players in driving India’s nuclear weapons program. 
Both institutions retain significant input and oversight over the nuclear weapons program, 
as well as great autonomy. Yet, their ability to drive India’s strategic arsenal has been 
lessened for several reasons. Both organizations are experiencing an infringement of 
command as the military increasingly takes greater control of the nuclear forces. For the 
DAE, several high-profile debates have weakened its authority and driving power. The 
DRDO has recently suffered from both funding shortfalls and a loss of confidence in its 
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abilities. Since they control crucial aspects of the nuclear command and control system, 
scientific organizations will remain relevant in influencing India’s nuclear weapons 
program, but the evidence indicates that this influence has steadily eroded since 1998. 
Due to this erosion, domestic factors are a weaker driving force than both security fears 
and the desire for great power status. 
B. POLITICAL PARTIES 
More than any other domestic factor, many analysts cite the political party as the 
primary driver that pushed India into an openly nuclear state. The BJP coalition is often 
cited as a “critical factor” in this monumental decision since it included “the strong 
Hindu-nationalist faction, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).”284 Achin Vanaik 
argues, “Neither scientists nor top civil servants are as important as the key coterie of 
Sangh ideologues/leaders and the politicians-administrators.”285 Whether it was to 
achieve great power status or guarantee India’s security, the Hindu nationalists were the 
hawkish faction that demanded a nuclear bomb regardless of international consequences. 
Nevertheless, even if this historical account were true, political parties are no longer a 
dominant driving force mainly due to the BJP’s own downfall. A successful nuclear 
policy did not translate into electoral victory, which has made nuclear security much less 
of a priority for political elites. Furthermore, the main party coalitions have not bothered 
to differentiate their nuclear policies, which makes political party ideology even less of a 
factor in India’s nuclear weapons program.  
Initially, the BJP experienced “overwhelming public support for the nuclear 
tests.”286 Yet, it later suffered a resounding loss in the 2004 elections to the Indian 
National Congress (INC) party coalition. Numerous reasons have been given to explain 
this defeat, but the most common are over-confidence in the party itself and a failure to 
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improve the economic conditions of impoverished Indians.287 Regardless, what is clear is 
that the BJP’s successful push for India to become a nuclear power was not enough to 
win votes. As mentioned by Deepa Ollapally, “there are important, heavy domestic 
pressures on the political leadership to sustain India’s economic growth.”288 Nationalistic 
pride at owning nuclear weapons could not outweigh these pressures. Indians may have 
felt some satisfaction that their country had now joined an elite club, but these weapons 
did not create jobs or bring food to the hungry. Despite the hopes of the political elites, 
increasing national pride failed to distract the people from more immediate issues and 
they voted accordingly.  
As a result, politicians have now weakened their focus on India’s nuclear security 
program. Arun Prakash has argued, “The politician, as a rule, has found it expedient to 
detach himself from national security matters because of his belief that they do not win or 
lose votes.”289 In its 2009 election manifesto, the INC only mentioned a commitment to 
nuclear energy and the civil-nuclear agreement it pursued with the United States.290 This 
commitment is in contrast to its 2004 manifesto, which at least paid lip service to a 
“credible nuclear weapons programme.”291 The BJP mentioned changing India’s 
strategic nuclear program, but only in the context of opposition to the civil-nuclear deal 
brokered by the INC.292 Neither manifesto delineated a strong change in India’s nuclear 
weapons program, nor any indication of a major shift in the program’s current direction. 
The Janata Dal party did reiterate a commitment to ICBMs in its own manifesto for 
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2009,293 but this commitment is in keeping with the current trends of the program as only 
a few years later, the INC would oversee the maiden launch of the Agni V. The one party 
that did advocate for a radical change was the Communist Party of India–Marxist, which 
advocated, “Striving for a de-nuclearised environment in South Asia.”294 Nonetheless, all 
the manifestos devoted much more space to tackling economic and social issues, 
especially corruption. While both of these issues were certainly major talking points for 
previous elections, they have remained so for more recent manifestos while the issue of 
nuclear security has dropped off. 
During the 2014 election, the BJP did make comments that it would revise India’s 
strategic doctrine, which sparked widespread furor that radical changes would abound if 
the BJP were elected. Most commentators’ greatest fear was that the BJP would change 
India’s NFU doctrine.295 Eventually, the BJP frontrunner, Narendra Modi, specifically 
stated there would not be any attempts to change the NFU doctrine.296 This explanation is 
in keeping with the trend since 1998; despite rhetoric on both sides, neither major party 
has had any significant differences in nuclear policy. This trend of strategic agreement 
likely continued before 1998. Although the BJP received credit for turning India into an 
openly nuclear power, Bhumitra Chakma notes that “the Congress Government attempted 
to test a nuclear weapon in December 1995,” but only aborted the attempt after the 
United States detected the preparations and applied extreme pressure.297 The INC wanted 
to turn India nuclear as well; they were simply less successful than the BJP at hiding their 
preparations. When the Congress-led coalition took back power in 2004, the trends set in 
motion by the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine did not suffer any real disruptions, especially 
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the desire for a viable nuclear triad. In fact, successful test launches of an ICBM and 
initial sea trials of a SSBN occurred under a Congress-led regime. The party reiterated its 
own commitment to a credible deterrent,298 and it continued the negotiations started by 
the BJP with the United States on its strategic weapons program.299  
The one nuclear issue that did cause political disagreement was the civil nuclear 
deal with the United States in 2008. Much of the BJP anger at the deal stemmed from 
clauses that required opening up the country to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which the BJP saw as an infringement upon India’s sovereignty and foreign 
policy options.300 Yet, the civil nuclear deal would not have truly affected India’s 
strategic reserves. As per the terms of the deal, eight reactors would not fall under any 
restrictions nor would any military facilities.301 Although Tellis argues that these reactors 
would likely not be used for weapons-grade plutonium “so long as India’s vast demand 
for power continues to remain unsatisfied,”302 nothing can stop India from doing so 
should the strategic situation warrant a vast increase in fissile-material production. 
Despite BJP fears of sovereignty infringement, the deal has arguably increased fissile-
material production since it frees up domestic reserves. Besides squabbling on details to 
gain political points, neither party has advocated a strong departure from the trends set in 
the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine. No party has truly set out to revamp or change the 
nuclear program, which further reinforces the argument that political leaders have mostly 
been hands-off when it comes to the program.  
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C. DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY 
While many analysts emphasize the role the BJP played in taking India nuclear, 
others attribute India’s scientists as the true “fathers of the Indian bomb programme.”303 
These scientists were mainly motivated by a desire “to show the West that they could do 
high-quality and original work on their own.”304 The two main scientific bodies that have 
been instrumental in India’s nuclear weapons program are the DAE and the DRDO. The 
DAE, which is in charge of India’s civilian nuclear program as well, manages the fissile 
cores.305 Due to its strong budget, the DAE likely enjoys continued high levels of 
autonomy and prestige, which makes it the strongest domestic factor in India’s nuclear 
weapons program. Nevertheless, indications have arisen that the DAE may be 
constrained in its influence. High-level debates over the civil-nuclear deal and the 
continuation of testing raise doubts as to the DAE’s authority, which makes it a less 
potent driver of India’s nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, as the military becomes 
increasingly involved in command and control, some of the autonomy the DAE enjoys 
will necessarily be limited. In the future, the DAE may become less of a driver. 
Unlike many other bureaucratic organizations, the atomic scientists enjoyed 
considerable autonomy. Arun Prakash has complained that the DAE has little oversight, 
which makes it “impossible to question overstated scientific claims or affix 
accountability for meeting time, cost and performance targets.”306 Part of its autonomy 
stems from the difficulty of its subject. The atomic scientists were able to enjoy a “role as 
[a] single source of information” due to “the complexity of the issue, and the general 
indifference of India’s political elite towards international issues.”307 The politicians 
more often than not ceded way to the expert opinion. Due to its position of expertise, 
leaders of the DAE and its subcomponent, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), likely 
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play leading roles in India’s NCA. Gaurav Kampani has speculated that “given India’s 
past institutional practices,” DAE and AEC officials likely are on both the Political 
Council and Executive Council of the NCA.308 
Prestige is difficult to measure, but one indication is a legacy of budgetary 
increases, which the DAE has enjoyed for much of its history. Although nuclear energy 
“contributes only about 2.5 per cent to the country’s power supply,” the DAE “receives a 
substantial share of the central government’s R and D expenditure.”309 Furthermore, it 
has enjoyed a trend of “copious budgetary increases” since the 1998 tests,310 which has 
continued to this day. Discerning precise budget numbers is sometimes a murky subject 
in India, but according to the Central Plan Outlays, the DAE saw an “increase of 55.59% 
from [2013 to 2014]—from Rs. 8,920 crore to Rs. 13,879 crore.”311 This large increase is 
mirrored by the demand for grants, in which the DAE saw an increase of 49.72 
percent.312 Both numbers are also far ahead of the previous budget increase between the 
2011 to 2012 plan and the 2012 to 2013 plan. According to the Central Plan Outlays, the 
increase was 22.92 percent,313 the demand for grants had a 13.78 percent increase,314 and 
the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) had a 7.99 percent increase.315 Regardless, 
these increases show a clear prioritization of the DAE, especially when compared to other 
scientific departments (See Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  DAE budget compared to other scientific agencies316 
Due to the immense budgets and autonomy, many analysts believe the DAE 
wields nearly unstoppable influence in determining nuclear policy. M. V. Ramana blames 
the DAE for “mistaken ideas” that have been enshrined into policy. Such ideas include 
“nuclear weapons preserve peace; the command and control of nuclear weapons is an 
easy task; nuclear reactors generate cheap electricity; and dealing with nuclear waste is 
not a problem.”317 Furthermore, many analysts believe the “top levels” of the DAE 
experienced strong pressure to be “socialized into or at least sympathetic to government 
propaganda and policy.”318 Yet, recent events have argued strongly against the DAE’s 
authority. Both bureaucratic and high level arguments have spilled into open 
disagreement with official DAE nuclear policy, which have weakened the organization as 
a force. Ashok Kapur discusses how immediately after the tests in 1998, the DAE 
“indicated that no further tests were required, and hence, there was no scientific reason 
not to sign the CTBT.”319 Despite this official stance, several prominent nuclear 
scientists have publicly disputed this view. Notably, P. K. Iyengar, former chairman of 
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the AEC, has outspokenly criticized the results of the Pokhran II tests as being much 
more underwhelming than published; the explosions were less than advertised and a 
thermonuclear reaction likely never occurred.320 K. Santhanam, a former nuclear advisor 
at DRDO, has echoed these sentiments.321 Both have urged further testing to guarantee 
an adequate strategic arsenal,322 a call that the nuclear establishment has resisted.323 
These calls for more tests were predicted by George Perkovich, who has argued, “Indian 
weaponeers will continue to press for unending programs to refine nuclear warheads and, 
more important, extend the range and diversity of missile systems.”324 Strong internal 
pressure to continue tests likely exists as India pursues “new delivery systems such as 
cruise missiles that would require major modifications in warhead design.”325 Such 
actions would further isolate India, which explains why top leaders continue to resist 
heeding such calls. Nevertheless, these public debates may indicate a split within the 
DAE, which may constrain its ability and authority to push through an agenda. Although 
India has not conducted any more nuclear tests, it has yet to sign the CTBT, which 
indicates a certain paralysis instead of decisively choosing one side of the debate. 
This same type of public debate can be seen in the furor over the civil nuclear 
deal. Ashley Tellis clearly delineates why the DAE has pursued this project. Not only 
does the agreement “provide India regularized access to imported natural uranium fuel,” 
it also opens “access to new reactor technology” and further integrates India “into the 
global nuclear industry’s research and development network.”326 Yet, some former DAE 
members, to include P. K. Iyengar, have voiced opposition to the deal on the same 
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grounds as the BJP, notably fears that the agreement would infringe on Indian 
sovereignty.327 Besides opening up some of their nuclear reactors to IAEA inspectors, 
critics also worried about creating an image of overreliance on the United States, who 
played an essential role in the NSG approving the deal.328 The DAE leaders clearly won 
this argument, but the battle was a close call; the measure passed by 275 votes to 256, 
with 10 votes abstaining.329 The ability of the opponents to put up a fight was doubtless 
bolstered by the former DAE experts.  
In the future, the influence of the DAE may further be weakened by the very 
element it is supporting, the military. Since the 2003 doctrine established the SFC, it has 
substantially increased its “organizational presence within India’s nuclear planning.”330 
One area that would significantly impinge on the DAE’s traditional area of nuclear 
control is the Indian Navy’s SLBM. The DAE controls the fissile cores, which remain de-
mated from the missile platforms. Yet, by necessity, the ballistic missiles onboard a 
submarine must be mated and ready for launch to be operational. As the military 
exercises greater control over nuclear assets, conversely the DAE will have a weaker 
ability to drive the program. By necessity, the military’s influence over nuclear matters 
will increase once the SSBN becomes operational.  
D. DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION 
The other scientific organization that has played a pivotal role in India’s nuclear 
weapons program is the DRDO, which is India’s premier military industrial organization. 
Like the DAE, it has traditionally enjoyed strong autonomy and a large budget hike after 
the 1998 tests. Yet, it is not as strong a domestic factor as the DAE. Recently, the military 
budget has remained somewhat stagnant, and the DRDO’s share of that budget has not 
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increased despite repeated recommendations to do so. Also, despite its notable 
accomplishments in nuclear delivery platforms, its reputation in other fields has been less 
than stellar, which has led to both a backlash and a drive to reorganize that further 
weakened the organization. Finally, like the DAE, its influence has decreased as the 
military exerts greater control. 
Much like their nuclear counterparts, DRDO scientists enjoy considerable 
autonomy due to little oversight. First, their organization enjoys a high level of secrecy, 
which “makes the DRDO even less accountable than other Indian S and T organisations 
in the public sector.”331 Also, much like the DAE, the DRDO has benefited from political 
overseers who had “little knowledge about strategic or military affairs, let alone the 
intricacies of military technology and hardware.”332 Both secrecy and inscrutability are 
multiplied when it comes to the DRDO’s role in nuclear technology. Furthermore, the 
DRDO’s push for indigenization makes considerable sense with nuclear-related weapons. 
Nearly every piece of technology associated with India’s nuclear modernization drive is 
indigenous. The exception is the BrahMos cruise missile, but even that is a joint venture 
by the DRDO and Russia. Since no nation would be willing to hand over nuclear-related 
technology as easily as they would conventional, India has no choice but to rely on the 
DRDO when it comes to ballistic missiles, missile shields, and other like items. For 
analysts like Christopher Clary, proof of this autonomy can be found in India’s pursuit of 
“very short-range ballistic missiles (Prahaar), ballistic missile defenses, multiple 
independently maneuverable reentry vehicles, and increasingly accurate medium- and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles.”333 Such advanced systems may be driven by the 
desires of the DRDO to prove its capability as opposed to strategic needs, although the 
desire for great power status and fears over China’s advanced arsenal may also be valid 
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drivers. Finally, due to its ownership of non-nuclear warhead assemblies,334 the DRDO 
likely plays a key role in the NAC on both the Executive and Political Councils.335 
Both immediately before and after the 1998 tests, defense R and D saw a dramatic 
boost in spending. Between 1994 to 1995 and 1999 to 2000, “R and D expenditure in 
dollar terms increased from $362 million... to $612 million.”336 Afterward, defense 
spending received “more than a threefold hike in the decade after the war in Kargil.”337 
Unlike the DAE, however, the DRDO has not seen such vast budget increases in more 
recent years. Although the 2013 to 2014 budget experienced a small amount of growth, 
“the modest increase in the defence budget comes in the wake of high inflationary and 
unfavourable exchange rate regimes.”338 This situation translates into a real negative 
growth of “by 1.3 per cent and 3.7 per cent in terms of WPI and CPI-NS, 
respectively.”339 Since the DAE can address both “military security and 
development,”340 it has been shielded by the defense stagnation that has plagued the 
DRDO.  
Furthermore, the DRDO has been unable to achieve a bigger portion of the 
defense budget. The DRDO has advocated for “9% of the total allocated sum for the 
defence sector”341 while the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence “has 
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recommended that [the] R&D budget should be at least 14 to 15 percent of the total 
defence budget of the country.”342 Nevertheless, “the R& D budget has been languishing 
at an average 6 percent of the defence budget since 2000.”343 The Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analysis (IDSA) think tank has seen a similar trend; with the DRDO budget 
allocation averaging six percent between 2008 and 2014 (see Figure 5). Furthermore, 
DRDO success in nuclear-related technology has not translated into any noticeable 
allocation increases. Between the 2009 to 2010 and 2010 to 2011 budgets, the DRDO 
saw its greatest jump in budgetary allocation as it went from 5.99 percent to seven 
percent.344 Yet, no successful maiden launches occurred in 2010. 2012 was a stellar year 
for DRDO nuclear achievements with the successful test launch of both the K-15 and 
Agni V, India’s first ICBM,345 but between the 2012 to 2013 and the 2013 to 2014 
budgets, the DRDO budget allocation went down from six percent to five percent of the 
total defense budget.346  
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Figure 5.  DRDO portion of defence budget347 
Beyond budget woes, the DRDO’s reputation has come under siege due to a 
failure to perform. Despite success in nuclear platforms, the DRDO has been unable to 
meet “qualitative requirements (QRS)” and much of their products suffer from 
“inordinate delay.”348 Personnel issues have also been a problem. Not only does the 
DRDO have the “most adverse ratios of engineers to auxillaries and support staff among 
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R and D organisations,”349 it has also been “haemorrhaging scientists and technicians at 
the rate of 20–27 per cent annually as they flock to the private sector.”350  
The DRDO’s issues have caused a backlash amongst Indian leaders, who have 
now started to scrutinize the agency’s performance. In 2007, the DRDO came under 
independent audit by an eight-member committee headed by P. Rama Rao, former chief 
of the Department of Science and Technology.351 Notably, one of the delayed systems 
that prompted the audit was the “Advanced Technology Vessel nuclear submarine 
programme,”352 which would later become the INS Arihant. In 2008, the committee 
“recommended that the DRDO turn over a number of its laboratories to other government 
agencies and confine itself to eight or 10 critical areas, where it had demonstrated 
competence.”353 Furthermore, Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony recommended the 
involvement of “private industries and businesses.”354 Several years passed before the 
recommendations were finally adopted in 2010,355 and efforts to decentralize the DRDO 
have continued in 2013.356 It remains to be seen whether these results will actually result 
in a more efficient and accountable organization. Nevertheless, what is not in doubt is 
that the DRDO has recently suffered both a loss of prestige and bureaucratic heft. Despite 
its success with the Agni-line of missiles, the DRDO may find it difficult to push for new 
projects if the Indian leadership remains dissatisfied with the organization’s results.  
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Also, like the DAE, the DRDO has suffered from a loss of influence due to the 
increasing role of the military. Unlike the DAE, however, the DRDO is a defense-only 
institution with a history of conflict with the armed forces, which means it will likely see 
an even greater encroachment by the military upon its priorities. This antipathy stems 
from a divergence in goals. The military “is interested in getting the best possible 
weapons irrespective of the producer,” while “the scientific establishment places greater 
value on the development of indigenous technological capacity even if it does not 
produce the weapons the military wants.”357 Due to this divergence, the perspective in 
the armed forces is that the DRDO has been forcing its technology on an unwilling 
military.358 Arun Prakash, a former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, argues that the 
military “continues to remain excluded from the higher echelons of the national security 
edifice,” but he also admits, “the SFC appears to be gaining in operational efficiency and 
is a frequent participant in DRDO’s missile test firings as well as regular drills and 
exercises.”359 Furthermore, the Indian Navy will gain control of a critical leg of the 
nuclear triad once the INS Arihant becomes operational. Despite Prakash’s fears that 
“New Delhi’s security establishment has remained frozen in time over the past six 
decades,”360 the SFC and its growing role are signs that the establishment is changing. In 
the future, the military will have a greater say, which will weaken the DRDO’s ability to 
push for its own favored projects over security needs. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Domestic factors remain important, but each is facing constraints that have 
reduced its influence. The strongest domestic factor is the DAE and scientists in the 
nuclear world. As long as India prioritizes overall development of the nation to include 
energy advancements, the DAE can justify its research and expenditures, and remain a 
potent force. The second strongest domestic factor is the DRDO, which recently has seen 
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budgetary woes and a crisis of faith in its abilities. The weakest domestic factors are the 
political parties, who are more inclined to focus their efforts on economic development 
and social ills as opposed to national security. Recently, rumors that the BJP would 
drastically change policy turned out to be baseless, and thus far, no indications are 
apparent that either the INC or BJP want to alter the trends set out in the 1999 draft 
nuclear doctrine significantly. Domestic factors may have been paramount before 1998, 
but due to recent changes in organization and bureaucratic priorities, their influence has 
waned and other elements, such as security fears, have become stronger explanations of 
India’s nuclear weapons program. 
 86 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 87 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. COMPARING THE FACTORS 
This thesis has examined four separate factors as possible drivers in India’s 
nuclear weapons program: security fears from China, security fears from Pakistan, the 
desire for great power status, and domestic elements. Also, the scope of this thesis has 
focused on the program’s evolution since 1998; instead of attempting to explain why 
India went nuclear, this thesis has narrowed its examination to determining what factors 
are currently relevant. Of all these factors, the security fear from China is the strongest 
driver behind India’s current trend of nuclear modernization and expansion. Another 
strong factor is India’s desire for great power status, which has encouraged the country’s 
strong growth in nuclear-related capabilities. Both security fears from China and the 
desire for great power status are potent drivers of India’s nuclear weapons program, but 
the China factor is stronger due to recent organizational changes that emphasize security 
concerns. Domestic organizations, such as political parties and scientific agencies, are the 
third strongest factor, and have weakened in potency since 1998 due to the same 
organizational changes that have decreased the influence of the status factor. Finally, 
security fears from Pakistan are currently the weakest driver of India’s nuclear weapons 
program. Since Indian capabilities have surpassed the point needed to handle Pakistan in 
a strategic sense, the continued growth of the program cannot be explained by any 
concerns over Pakistan’s own arsenal.  
More than any other factor, China as a security threat has increased in prominence 
as a driver in India’s nuclear weapons program since 1998. Both India and China have 
seen strong economic growth in the past decade, but China has experienced higher levels 
of prosperity, which has allowed it to retain its strong lead in both conventional and 
nuclear forces.361 Furthermore, despite increasing engagement, outstanding issues that 
may lead to conflict still exist between the two nations. Resource disputes, Indian anger 
at Chinese support to Pakistan, and friction from an unresolved border may all drive the 
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two most populous nations into a confrontation. Indian hawks and moderates may 
disagree on whether China presents an immediate threat, but both sides concur that as 
long as China retains its lead in both conventional and nuclear fields, their state must 
focus on its nuclear arsenal as its only viable counter. The goal is to turn the arsenal into 
a force that can reliably deter China, not to reach nuclear or conventional parity; to 
attempt parity would be foolhardy considering China’s economic advantages. Statements 
from both hawkish and moderate elites also support this desire to counter China 
asymmetrically through a strong nuclear deterrent. Finally, India’s own nuclear weapons 
program has moved in a direction that best counters China. Focusing on long-range 
ballistic missiles and deploying strike aircraft that can carry nuclear-capable cruise 
missiles near the Himalayan borders are all strategies that can better deter China. 
Although other drivers may explain these actions, China as a security threat is the 
strongest explanation for India’s nuclear weapons program when factoring in the 
country’s threat environment, elite statements, and the trajectory of the program itself.  
Pakistan as a security threat is the weakest driver behind India’s strategic arsenal. 
Immediately after 1998, a strong argument could be made that India was more focused on 
Pakistan since both nations had just started their nuclear programs and India had yet to 
achieve an operational IRBM. Now that it has already deployed the Agni II, which can 
cover all of Pakistan,362 India has reached a point at which its leaders are confident that 
their nation has the capabilities needed to deal with their western neighbor in a strategic 
sense. Furthermore, the Pakistani nuclear threats that India is concerned about are not 
issues that can be countered with an advanced arsenal. India fears both escalation and a 
non-state actor acquiring a nuclear warhead. To deal with these threats, it has engaged in 
diplomatic confidence-building measures, as well as rhetoric that promises massive 
retaliation. Neither strategy involves changing India’s nuclear weapons program. For 
instance, Pakistan’s new emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons certainly raises the risks 
of escalation into a nuclear conflict, but none of India’s strategic projects has any utility 
in countering this development. Also, India’s Cold Start doctrine, which advocates a 
conventional-only approach to Pakistan, demonstrates its confidence in both its 
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conventional and nuclear superiority. Arguably, this confidence is misplaced, but 
nevertheless, India has continued on a trajectory of continued growth in both the quantity 
and quality of its nuclear arsenal. The threat of Pakistan by itself does not adequately 
explain this trend. 
The desire for great power status is a strong factor in explaining India’s nuclear 
weapons program, but it remains secondary to security fears over China. Although India 
has recently become more accepted as a nuclear power, it still has not gained universal 
acceptance from countries like China, Japan, and Australia. To counter this lack of 
acceptance, India has embarked on a campaign to portray itself as a responsible nuclear 
power, a campaign that also involves increasing its capabilities to improve its credibility 
as a nuclear weapons state. By developing capabilities, such as ICBM technology, India 
can become a significant nuclear power, which puts pressure on the international system 
to take it more seriously as a partner in treaties and nonproliferation agreements. In turn, 
these new memberships will help India gain increased legitimacy and acceptance as a 
nuclear weapons state. This capability can also help India improve its legitimacy by 
helping it create a record of nonproliferation with its new technology. Also, elite 
statements indicate a strong level of pride in both international nuclear achievements, as 
well as indigenous breakthroughs in technology. Finally, the nuclear program has not 
deviated much from the goals of the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine, which was set up before 
outlining specific security fears. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the SFC, the 
military has steadily increased its control over India’s nuclear affairs. Furthermore, India 
has never used its growing nuclear capability as justification for a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council, and instead, has chosen to emphasize its demographic and 
economic power. Organizational changes, as well as India’s own foreign policy, indicate 
that the desire for great power status has decreased in potency since 1998. Although it 
remains a strong driver, it has been eclipsed by security fears over China.  
Domestic factors were likely a big influence in pushing India to go openly nuclear 
with the 1998 tests, but recent trends have curtailed that influence. Ever since the 
electoral loss of the BJP in 2004, the political value of success in nuclear security appears 
to have diminished. Furthermore, no substantive difference exists in nuclear policy 
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between the two major party coalitions. Although the BJP recently promised to re-
evaluate the nuclear doctrine, no significant changes in India’s strategic arsenal have 
occurred, which indicate that nuclear security continues to be a non-issue for political 
parties. Scientific organizations, on the other hand, continue to retain significant 
influence. Both the DAE and the DRDO control key components of India’s atomic 
weapons, and both organizations have personnel on the branches that form the NCA, the 
Political Council and Executive Council.363 Both the DAE and DRDO also benefit from 
strong autonomy, which allows them to drive agendas despite nominally following 
political rule. While the DAE benefits from an enormous budget since it is in charge of 
both the nuclear weapons program, as well as India’s civilian nuclear energy program,364 
it nevertheless has recently suffered a loss of authority due to public disputes that have 
gone against official policy, as well as increasing encroachment by the military. The 
DRDO also suffers from the same encroachment by the military, but it has also suffered 
from a stagnant budget, as well as a loss of confidence from political leaders who have 
become dissatisfied with its desultory performance. Domestic factors, especially the DAE 
and DRDO, may remain stronger drivers for India’s nuclear weapons program than 
Pakistan, but they are weaker than both China and the desire for great power status. 
At the same time, these factors are not completely separate entities from one 
another. China as a threat may be the strongest factor in India’s nuclear weapons 
program, but the country also plays a role in India’s desire for great power status. It has 
actively blocked India’s bid to be a part of the NSG365 and refuses to engage with India 
as a nuclear peer, a fact that Indian leaders find aggravating.366 As long as China 
continues to snub its southern neighbor, India will likely pursue capabilities that can 
enhance its prestige, both to deter China and to signal China to take it more seriously as a 
fellow nuclear power. A similar relationship exists between the desire for great power 
status and domestic factors, especially the DRDO. Indigenous projects that require 
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advanced technological skills can enhance India’s international prestige, but they can also 
enhance the reputation of the scientific organizations that succeed with such projects. For 
instance, the latest success in achieving a functioning reactor with the INS Arihant not 
only increased national pride, but also encouraged Indian politicians to praise “our 
scientific community particularly those working with DRDO.”367 Conversely, the lack of 
political success from pursuing nuclear-related achievements may indicate that Indian 
voters do not necessarily care about international accomplishment, which, in turn, 
weakens the desire for great power status as a driver. Finally, certain technological 
triumphs may have multiple plausible drivers. For instance, the Agni V could 
simultaneously deter China, gain international prestige for India, and also reflect great 
credit on its scientific agencies. As long as current and future nuclear-related projects can 
have multiple, plausible motivations, it will be difficult to separate each driver 
completely and weigh them accurately. Nevertheless, by taking a comprehensive look 
and comparing every factor in a relative sense, this thesis has determined that security 
fears over China are the strongest driver of India’s nuclear weapons program, with the 
desire for great power status remaining a strong but secondary driver. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR STABILITY 
As long as China remains the strongest driver of India’s nuclear weapons 
program, it will be inextricably linked to South Asian nuclear stability. Whatever actions 
it takes will likely reverberate throughout both India and Pakistan. Due to its own fears 
over “nuclear coercion” from the United States,368 China will likely continue to 
modernize and enhance its strategic arsenal. Even if it decides to halt its current trend of 
upgrading both its conventional and nuclear forces, the capability gaps in both areas are 
so large that India will continue to feel pressured into developing a strong nuclear arsenal 
in the near future. Pakistan, which feels the same type of pressure from India, will likely 
follow suit and also receive substantial assistance from China. India, finding this 
assistance threatening, will further encourage its own arsenal building, and the arms race 
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will continue. Some analysts have described this situation as a “vicious circle, in which 
an action by one results in an escalatory reaction from the other two.”369 Not only does 
this cycle of escalation increase the risk of a nuclear conflict, it also heightens distrust, 
which debilitates any chances for a diplomatic resolution. Furthermore, the likely 
increase in Pakistan’s arsenal will have destabilizing consequences beyond South Asia 
itself.  
Currently, these three nations are the only declared nuclear powers actively 
increasing the size of their arsenals, which raises proliferation concerns in the region. As 
long as either India or China feels insecure about the status of its arsenal, this trend of 
both quantitative and qualitative growth will likely continue in the near future. Unless 
Pakistan sees a vast jump in its own arsenal, its actions are unlikely to affect India’s own 
nuclear weapons program, which prioritizes the China security threat. Nevertheless, 
Pakistan’s arsenal will likely continue to grow in response to India’s own projected 
strategic expansion. Although all three nations have a long way to go before catching up 
to the nuclear weapons stockpiles of either Russia or the United States, the regional 
tensions, as well as the complicated trilateral nature of the relationship, may increase the 
chance of escalation more so than the bilateral posturing that occurred during the Cold 
War. Furthermore, the geography itself raises the risks of a nuclear conflict. The United 
States and the former Soviet Union were separated by thousands of miles of ocean, which 
gave leaders on both sides time to determine whether launches were false warnings or 
mistakes. India and Pakistan, being neighboring adversaries, have no such luxuries. A 
false warning on one side could easily turn into multiple barrages before leaders on both 
sides have a chance to contact one another. The possible deployment of nuclear-capable 
Su-30MKI aircraft near the Himalayas, coupled with China’s own build-up in the region, 
may also raise the stakes of escalation between these two nations. Although nuclear war 
between India and China appears less likely than nuclear war between India and Pakistan, 
as long as outstanding issues still exist, and both nations continue modernizing their 
arsenals, the risk that a border conflict may escalate into a more catastrophic outbreak 
cannot be completely dismissed.  
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The situation of constant escalation also exacerbates existing tensions. In this 
dynamic, India may feel more threatened than either nation since the other states have a 
strong partnership that India often perceives to be directed against it. Rather than see 
Pakistan as a separate threat, India views Chinese assistance to Pakistan as evidence of a 
“hostile Sino-Pakistan nuclear nexus, which continues to operate even today.”370 India 
may feel confident in its abilities to deal with Pakistan on both a conventional and 
strategic level, but nonetheless, any Pakistani military advancement will be seen as proof 
of a Sino-Pakistani alliance. Much like how former Defence Minister Fernandes blamed 
China for Pakistan’s acquisition of the Ghauri IRBM,371 Indian leaders today will likely 
continue to blame China as Pakistan increases its own technological capabilities. In turn, 
tensions will be raised and the trust necessary to reach any diplomatic solutions between 
all three nations will be diminished.  
China for its part will likely respond to Indian advancements with continued 
Pakistani assistance. Soon after the United States and India finalized their civil nuclear 
deal, China conducted a similar civil nuclear deal with Pakistan.372 In the future, China 
may increase this assistance as Indian capabilities continue to grow. Although its 
government has consistently refused to deal with India as a nuclear peer, Chinese media 
reports convey a sense of unease as India edges closer to a strategic arsenal that can 
credibly threaten China. After the successful launch of the Agni V, as well as Indian 
media proclamations that the missile was a “China-killer,”373 Ananth Krishnan notes that 
Chinese media reports fired back at India with statements that warned India not to 
become “arrogant during disputes with China.”374 These media reports further warned, 
“For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with 
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China.”375 If India makes any more advancements, such as credible MIRV technology, 
China may increase the technological assistance it gives to Pakistan, as well as accelerate 
the modernization of its own strategic arsenal. 
The nuclear dynamics between India and Pakistan will likely continue to be 
destabilizing for three key reasons. First, India’s confidence in its ability to deal with 
Pakistan may actually heighten the risk of escalation. As long as Indian leaders believe 
the conventional strategy of Cold Start can be accomplished without triggering Pakistani 
red-lines, then the risk of a limited local conflict turning into a nuclear exchange is 
always present. Unfortunately, due to the chaotic nature of war, many uncertainties exist, 
such as false warning alarms that can easily trigger a red-line and invite an escalatory 
response. Second, Pakistan’s new emphasis on TNWs further heightens this risk of 
escalation. By creating nuclear weapons that can be used on the battlefield in a tactical 
sense, Pakistan has drastically lowered the threshold for nuclear war. Indian leaders have 
repeatedly stressed that they would respond to any nuclear strike, even a limited tactical 
one, with overwhelming force.376 Finally, the growing strength of Islamic extremists may 
also enhance the possibility of escalation. These extremists have increasingly acted out of 
control for Pakistani authorities, going as far as attacking Pakistani security forces,377 as 
well as facilities that may house nuclear weapons.378 As long as authorities in India and 
Pakistan have poor cooperation in combating terrorism, extremists can exploit this seam 
to conduct attacks and provoke strong Indian reprisals, which furthers their propaganda 
campaign. A situation could be easily envisioned in which India suffers a terrorist attack, 
but dissatisfied with Pakistan’s response, decides to launch Cold Start to take action 
against the militants into their own hands. Pakistani authorities use a TNW in response 
and then a nuclear conflict has erupted. 
The combination of TNWs and strong Islamic extremists in Pakistan may also 
have destabilizing effects beyond South Asia. Groups like the LeT and Tehrik-e Taliban 
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Pakistan (TTP) maintain strong links with Islamic extremists in other nations. Due to 
their mobility, relatively small size, and the likelihood of being deployed to vulnerable 
battlefield locations, TNWs are more susceptible to seizure by a non-state actor and they 
are much easier to transport to locations outside Pakistan. Using a cargo ship, trans-
national terrorists can carry a stolen TNW to Mumbai or potentially outside the region to 
strike at targets as far away as the United States. These extremists do not even need to 
steal the entire platform to cause international panic. The warheads on TNWs are 
designed to be smaller than those on larger ballistic missiles. By taking a small amount of 
fissile material and combining it with traditional explosives, terrorists can create a dirty 
bomb that will be just as effective in inciting hysteria and complicating first response 
efforts.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Regardless of current U.S. policy, it already is seen as a key player in South Asian 
nuclear stability. China’s own campaign to upgrade its strategic arsenal is likely directed 
against the United States,379 which is its most capable potential adversary. Since India’s 
strongest driver is China’s nuclear program, the Western superpower has an indirect 
effect on India’s arsenal, and consequently, on Pakistan’s as well. Despite its 
geographical distance, the United States is just as involved in this security spiral as 
China, India, and Pakistan. Also, its own interests in countering global proliferation are 
greatly complicated by the nuclear dynamics in South Asia. Critics within Pakistan and 
China are quick to condemn U.S. endeavors to block the transfer of nuclear technology as 
hypocritical due its own civil nuclear deal with India.380 Furthermore, this deal has not 
translated into a strong partnership with India, at least to the level of the alliance enjoyed 
by China and Pakistan. Finally, the United States remains very concerned with the 
potential for nuclear terrorism as Pakistan continues to expand its arsenal and engage in 
efforts that may heighten the risk of a non-state seizure. 
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As outlined in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States currently 
maintains a strong commitment to stability in South Asia,381 and counter-proliferation of 
both nuclear and ballistic missile technology.382 Finding a way to slow down the security 
spiral in South Asia would certainly help with both goals. Unfortunately, U.S. efforts at 
engagement with the region have been hampered since at least two major players, 
Pakistan and China, do not see the Western power as an impartial observer. Suspicions by 
both nations that the United States is biased towards India have only been heightened by 
the 2008 civil nuclear deal. Furthermore, some analysts have also speculated that the 
U.S.-led tilt towards India is part of a broader strategy to contain and encircle China.383 
As for Pakistan, it has its own history of tumultuous relations with the United States that 
prevents it from engaging constructively on sensitive nuclear issues. As long as both 
Pakistan and China view the United States with suspicion, any attempts to curtail 
strategic upgrades in the interest of stability and nonproliferation will be met with strong 
resistance. 
Also, the U.S.-tilt towards India has not translated into a strong partnership for 
both nations. India itself has been unsure of what to make of its relationship with the 
United States. It recognizes the security benefits of allying with a superpower, especially 
since “the extent to which Indo-U.S. strategic relations grow in the near to medium term 
will be an important external factor in gauging perceptions of Indian vulnerability and 
status.”384 Yet, India also fears losing its autonomy by drawing too close to such a strong 
nation. Some backlash has already occurred among Indian elites due to a perceived 
overreliance on the United States. Specifically, the civil nuclear deal is seen as proof that 
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India has cast its lot with the West, and that it has disrupted “time tested relations with 
Russia and west Asian countries” as a result.385 
In addition to fears over regional stability, U.S. fears over proliferation and the 
potential for nuclear terrorism are particularly strong over Pakistan. Due to its own 
history of dealing with Islamic extremism, the United States greatly fears the possibility 
that one or more nuclear weapons from Pakistan would fall into a non-state actor’s hands 
as the regime continues to face bold attacks by militants like LeT. Unfortunately, instead 
of enhancing cooperation to combat a common foe, the public voicing of these fears has 
led to a strong backlash by Pakistani authorities.386 Tensions have increased between the 
two states as Pakistan fears that the United States intends to steal the Islamic nation’s 
arsenal under the guise of securing nuclear weapons from terrorists. The 2011 raid that 
killed Osama bin Laden, which demonstrated U.S. ability to penetrate deep into Pakistani 
territory, only aggravated these fears.387 In response, Pakistan has undertaken its own 
actions to ensure that an outside power cannot seize its entire arsenal, to include 
expanding the quantity of its nuclear warheads,388 and allegedly, periodically dispersing 
its strategic weapons in “civilian-style vehicles without noticeable defenses.”389 These 
measures would certainly complicate a foreign power’s attempt to seize multiple strategic 
weapons, but they also make individual warheads more vulnerable to acquisition by a 
non-state actor.  
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Due to the complicated nuclear dynamics in the region, the United States must 
tread carefully as it navigates diplomatic relations with all three nations. It should still 
pursue engagement with the region, but it needs to be patient, in particular with a country 
like India that is cautious of entangling alliances. Also, the engagement must be led by 
competent diplomats who could also continue ties with Pakistan and China so that both 
nations do not feel alienated as a Western power draws closer to India. Pursuing a 
multilateral forum may be the best bet for the United States to slow down the regional 
trend of strategic modernization. 
As it pursues continued engagement with India, the United States must recognize 
how strongly this growing power values its autonomy.390 Much of the current delays and 
pitfalls in the U.S.-India relationship can be attributed to this great fear that any closer 
ties with the West would place this autonomy at risk. Undoubtedly, as both nations 
progress in their relationship, “India and the United States will likely continue to quarrel 
over a wide range of issues, from development policy to climate change.”391 The United 
States should recognize that the best approach would involve incremental progress that 
will likely see some setbacks. Also, an understanding of India’s desire for great power 
status can help provide some key leverage. India still desires “access to certain forms of 
advanced technology and defense equipment that the United States and its allies can 
provide.”392 Also, it “remains significantly underrepresented in key institutions that 
define great-power status,”393 such as the NPT. The United States still holds much sway 
over such organizations, and much like how it convinced the NSG to allow an exception 
for the U.S.-India deal, it can provide crucial support for India’s future membership 
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campaigns. By offering its aid in both technology and diplomatic support, the United 
States can push India forward on engagement even when the inevitable setbacks occur. 
The United States should also increase engagement with China and Pakistan. It 
needs to build better ties with both nations and assure them that closer U.S. ties with 
India do not necessarily mean a degradation of relations with Pakistan and China as well. 
Regional forums that specifically address the issue of nuclear stability can be another 
diplomatic avenue. Both India and Pakistan are already observer nations for the Shanghai 
Cooperative Organization; China could help leverage this organization to start regional 
talks specifically focused on stabilizing nuclear relations. To maximize the effectiveness 
of such an institution, the United States should also encourage the presence of Russia, a 
nation with which it has already engaged in constructive nuclear talks. Both states can 
use their experience in the previous arms reduction treaties to help guide the agenda. 
Furthermore, Russia, China, the United States, India, and Pakistan all face a common 
adversary in the form of Islamic extremism. Taking a cooperative approach to this issue 
can help assuage U.S. and Indian fears over Pakistan’s strategic arsenal, which in turn, 
can help placate Pakistani fears that other states would attempt to secure its nuclear 
warheads.  
All three nuclear powers in South and East Asia have a common interest in not 
seeing a devastating war erupt. Furthermore, India and China are undergoing crucial 
phases of growth that depend on regional stability. These multiple points of common 
interests can provide the United States and other world powers a base from which they 
can engage in a constructive dialogue that will help stabilize the nuclear relationships in 
the region. Currently, due to its security fears over China, India will likely continue to 
push for a quantitative and qualitative improvement in its strategic arsenal. Due to their 
own security fears, China and Pakistan will likewise do the same. To counter this trend, 
cautious but effective diplomatic action must be undertaken so that all three states can see 
the greater danger of escalation and proliferation. The United States and Russia have 
made great progress in de-escalating the potential for nuclear conflict between them, but 
to counteract continued global proliferation, these actors must now focus their attention 
on South Asia.  
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